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As it approaches the 1990's, the Soviet Union is entering a new era. Economic reform (perestroika), popular participation (democratization) and greater openness in society (glasnost) are the hallmarks of change; this evolution is apparent in the Soviet approach to foreign policy and its relations with the United States. "The Soviet leadership understands all too well the need for an adroit and carefully constructed response to United States initiatives in arms control and East-West relations in Europe. Given its preoccupation with domestic issues . . . the Soviet government must choose its battles carefully."

The New United States—Soviet Détente

BY COIT D. BLACKER

Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Southern California

AFTER United States President Ronald Reagan's return from Moscow in June, 1988, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union entered a relatively quiescent phase; Americans turned their attention from the vagaries of world politics to the complex, chaotic task of choosing President Reagan's successor. The virtual hiatus in superpower relations continued during the first several months of 1989, while the new administration, led by President Reagan's loyal Vice President, George Bush, began a comprehensive three-part review of United States national security policy, including a fresh look at Soviet-American relations.¹

The prolonged transition from the Reagan to the Bush administration notwithstanding, the 12 months separating the fourth Reagan-Gorbachev summit of June, 1988, from the Soviet President's triumphal visit to West Germany in mid-June, 1989, were not without their share of high political drama. For the most part, the script was written in Moscow.

In December, 1988, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, in an address to the United Nations General Assembly, announced an effective 20 percent reduction over five years in Soviet military manpower, including the withdrawal of some

50,000 Soviet troops from East Europe, as well as significant cuts in armor, artillery and tactical aircraft.² Equally provocative arms control initiatives followed in rapid succession. In 1989, Gorbachev undertook a number of high-visibility foreign visits that took him (among other stops) to London (April), Beijing (May), Bonn (June) and Paris (July), for face-to-face discussions with his British, Chinese, West German and French counterparts.

The outlines of the new administration's Soviet policy began to emerge in April, with President Bush's speech on United States-East European relations (delivered in Hamtramck, Michigan). On May 12, and again two weeks later, George Bush spoke to the issue directly, sketching his vision for the development of superpower relations. Asserting that the West had prevailed in the historic postwar struggle between "democracy and freedom" and "tyranny and conflict," he argued that the time had come to move "beyond containment" and urged the integration of the Soviet Union into "the community of nations."³

On balance, the President's remarks were well received, both at home and abroad, despite what one Soviet commentator characterized as the persistence of "old, primitive clichés" and "hackneyed stereotypes."⁴ Also in May, United States Secretary of State James Baker traveled to Moscow for two days of consultations with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. At the end of their meetings, the two men expressed "satisfaction with the overall results" of the discussions and committed their governments to continue the political dialogue

¹The Washington Post, February 9, 1989, p. 32; and The New York Times, April 9, 1989.

²The New York Times, December 8, 1988; and Pravda, December 8, 1988, p. 1.

³The New York Times, May 13, 1989.

⁴V. Gan, "According to Old Recipes," Pravda, May 14, 1989, p. 5.

at the highest level.⁵ At last, it seemed, the wait was over. Relations between Washington and Moscow were back on track.

THE NEW DETENTE: MORE MAY BE LESS

Appearances, of course, can be deceiving. The generalized sense of relief during the middle months of 1989, particularly among political pundits in the United States, that United States-Soviet relations had at long last recovered some of the momentum lost during the long transition from Ronald Reagan to George Bush, concealed important perceptual differences between the two sides. This seems certain to complicate the search for a broadly based and sustainable accommodation between Washington and Moscow. The roots of the problem can be traced to the superpower détente of the late 1960's and early 1970's.

For policymakers in the administrations of United States President Richard Nixon and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, the decision to seek a reduction in tensions constituted one policy option among several, on which each side embarked opportunistically and largely in response to the actions, initiatives and reassurances of the other.⁶ Each government expected to benefit at the other's expense, even as the tone and substance of bilateral relations improved. Most important, leaders on both sides appeared to understand the relationship in similar ways, at least at the outset, sharing a belief in the essential equality of the incentive structure. In other words, while their reasons for seeking an improvement in relations might—and did—differ, the two governments perceived the incentives to be roughly equal in intensity, producing an inexact but potentially workable balance of interests.

Given the fact that both sides also saw détente as optional and voluntary in nature, each was accorded considerable leverage over the actions of the other through what students of game theory term the threat to "defect" from, or to abandon, the cooperative "game."⁷ When, during the mid- to late 1970's, Washington and Moscow took strong ex-

ception to various aspects of each other's international conduct, instances of defection—and later retaliation—proliferated dramatically on both sides, fatally disturbing the fragile and interconnected balance of interests that had made détente possible in the first place.⁸

The ignoble collapse of the détente of the 1970's should not detract from the larger point that, at least initially, this first sustained attempt to normalize superpower relations in the postwar era had been fully mutual, with the two governments committed, more or less equally, to its success. The fault, in other words, lay less in the design than in the execution.

The problem confronting American and Soviet policymakers in 1989 is very nearly the reverse. The warming in superpower relations that began in 1985 with the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit caught most observers by surprise, coming hard on the heels of four of the most tension-filled years in postwar history. The sudden improvement in relations seemed to proceed almost randomly, without (on the American side at least) a clear sense of purpose or direction. The Kremlin's policy also had an ad hoc quality, especially during Gorbachev's first several months as General Secretary; even at this early stage, however, the Soviet leader's determination to improve relations with Washington was manifest.

Three years of intense bilateral diplomacy followed, yielding, among other dividends, four superpower summits, regular ministerial meetings between the United States secretary of state and the Soviet foreign minister, substantial progress toward the conclusion of a new strategic arms reduction (START) agreement, and in December, 1987, the signing of the treaty eliminating United States and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).⁹

These and other important achievements in United States-Soviet relations during President Reagan's second term tend to obscure the fact that much of the movement toward a new détente has come about not as a consequence of a conscious or self-interested design—including the provision for elaborate and reciprocal concessions on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union—but from Moscow's newfound willingness to accommodate United States policy on a host of issues, from strategic arms control to the resolution of various regional disputes.

The danger in such a situation is that it may mislead United States policymakers into believing that the incentives to seek a long-term accommodation between the superpowers are much stronger for the Soviet Union than they are for the United States. Indelicately put, it appears that Moscow wants, or needs, a new détente more than Washington. This

⁵*Pravda*, May 12, 1989, p. 5.

⁶See especially Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 24–68.

⁷The literature on game theory is extensive. For a concise discussion of cooperative games, in particular the incentives to defect, see Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

⁸See Coit D. Blacker, *Reluctant Warriors: The United States, The Soviet Union and Arms Control* (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1987), pp. 99–129.

⁹The draft text of the START agreement is confidential. For the INF treaty, see "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles," *Department of State Bulletin*, February, 1988, pp. 24–77.

could render all but impossible the weaving of that intricate web of mutually binding commitments and obligations, without which a détente-like relationship cannot long endure between two adversaries as powerful and self-directed as the United States and the Soviet Union.

The absence of such a subtle and complex policy infrastructure emboldens United States decision-makers to believe that the United States may be in a position to reap the benefits of détente with little effort and at essentially no cost. Officials of the Bush administration appear to have decided, for example, that if Soviet leaders sincerely desire a new détente, they must be prepared to absorb most of the associated costs, including (but not limited to) a meaningful reduction in Soviet military capabilities and either lessened influence in or a more "constructive" posture toward such critical regions of the world as East Europe and the Middle East.

In exchange, the Bush administration has publicly pledged to act in a restrained manner and to resist the temptation to exploit whatever opportunities might arise as the Soviet Union adjusts to its newly diminished stature in the world politics.¹⁰ This raises important questions about the durability of the process when and if Soviet leaders conclude that they can concede no more.

Current American policy toward the Soviet Union is based implicitly, then, on two key assumptions: that the Soviet leadership will pay a steep price for a long-term reduction in global tensions, and that the road to a new détente lies through Washington. Should either of these assumptions prove to be unfounded, the implications for United States policy could be profound and, from the perspective of those responsible for its conduct, deeply disturbing. After all, it is only through a certain commonality in perspective—a shared, if unexpressed, understanding of the essential conditions that have brought the two superpowers to this point in their relations—that the architects of United States policy can hope to influence Soviet decision-makers in ways likely to benefit Washington.

In their private ruminations if not in their public statements, the Kremlin leadership would probably agree with the assessment that reducing world tensions is a more important objective for the Soviet Union than it is at present for the United States. They would probably disagree, however, with the

judgment that Soviet interest in a more stable, less threatening international environment can be secured only through an accommodation with the United States, largely on Washington's terms.

The success of Gorbachev's reform program—from the revitalization of the economy to the democratization of Soviet political life—requires the conjunction of a vast array of forces and factors, both domestic and international. While the relationship between these two sets of considerations is complex, the centrality of the latter is apparent. There are several reasons. Given the profound economic and social dislocation that inevitably accompanies reforms of the magnitude currently under way in the Soviet Union, the leadership must have strong confidence in the underlying stability of the international order. To undertake such a fundamental reorganization of society at a time when the risk of war is seen to be large or growing could prove suicidal. To the extent that Soviet foreign policy serves to alleviate international tensions, it strengthens the hand of those within the leadership who argue that domestic economic and political reforms are imperative and that external conditions are propitious for their implementation.

On a more practical level, perestroika is an expensive proposition, heavily dependent for its success on the utilization of previously unavailable human and material resources. Redirecting rubles from the military to the civilian sectors of the economy, either indirectly (by retooling defense industries to produce capital and consumer goods), or directly (by shifting funds from the former to the latter) is an obvious way for the Soviet leadership to extract more resources from the country's stagnant economy. Trimming defense spending can be risky business, however, particularly when a state has multiple adversaries, many of which may be in a better position to bear the burden of high defense outlays. A new détente with Washington, making possible the attainment of agreements to reduce mutually strategic and conventional armaments, could help relieve this burden; a new détente could also result in sizable budgetary savings over the long term.

Recent Soviet diplomatic and arms control initiatives should be interpreted in this light. Gorbachev's high-profile visits to the United Kingdom, China, West Germany and France during the first half of 1989 have already been noted. In each instance the Soviet President did his best to reassure his hosts of the Kremlin's fundamental commitment to international peace and stability. His visit to Beijing was especially noteworthy in this regard, bringing to an end three decades of intense hostility and mutual suspicion and resulting in a de facto rapprochement with the Chinese leadership.¹¹

¹⁰Note, in particular, in his speeches of May 12 and May 24, 1989, President Bush's strong endorsement of and support for the Gorbachev reform program, his call for the integration of the Soviet Union into the "community of nations" and his emphasis on building "a better, more stable relationship" with Moscow. All are designed to reassure the Soviet leadership of the administration's fundamentally benevolent intentions.

¹¹See "Joint Soviet-Chinese Communiqué," *Pravda*, May 19, 1989, p. 1.

To underscore the seriousness of his intentions, in addition to the measures contained in his December, 1988, United Nations speech, Gorbachev has also announced a startling series of unilateral moves to curtail Soviet military power — from the withdrawal of 500 tactical nuclear warheads deployed in East Europe to the removal of thousands of Soviet troops from their forward positions in Mongolia.¹² At the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), Gorbachev authorized Soviet negotiators, first in March, 1989, and again in more detail two months later, to advance ambitious proposals for the mutual reduction of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and Warsaw Pact forces.¹³

If implemented, these proposals could result in the establishment of common East-West ceilings in military manpower, as well as equality in the number of tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, tactical aircraft and assault helicopters. To achieve such an outcome, the Soviet Union and its East European allies would be required to undertake reductions in troop strength and weaponry in many cases two to three times as large as those envisaged for NATO countries.

The logic of Gorbachev's strategy is clear and compelling. To relieve external pressures on the Soviet Union—deemed essential to the struggle to reform the Soviet system—the Kremlin must mend political fences with those countries that are in a position to threaten Soviet security interests and with which it has recently been at odds. To do so, Gorbachev must be willing to make concessions on issues of particular salience to those political leaders he seeks to impress. He has been able to accomplish this through a blend of persistence and skillful personal diplomacy, capped by his apparent willingness to make do with less militarily. Judging by the results, the Gorbachev "charm offensive" has proved to be all but irresistible.

It is the second of Washington's policy assumptions—that the road to a new détente lies through Washington—to which Gorbachev and his foreign policy advisers may well take exception. From the Soviet perspective, one of the most interesting developments in contemporary international politics must surely be the acceleration of centrifugal tendencies within the Western world. The most notable of these tendencies is the erosion of relations between the United States and many of its major

European and Asian allies because of continuing frictions over trade, technology transfer issues, arms control policy and military strategy. In addition, Moscow can hardly be unaware of the recent cooling of relations between Washington and Beijing, once described by both as close.

With the collapse during the mid- to late 1980's of what must have looked to Kremlin leaders like a nascent anti-Soviet front, Moscow moved quickly to develop better ties with each of the would-be coalition's principal partners. As relations warmed between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and West European countries and China, on the other, the leadership found itself freed from excessive dependence on the goodwill of any one of these states. In other words, while a new détente remains the Kremlin's overarching policy objective, improving superpower relations has become one of the several avenues—if still the most important and heavily traveled—by which Soviet leaders can hope to achieve their goals.

Under such conditions, the normalization of relations with the United States becomes the means to an end and not, as it sometimes seemed during the earlier détente, an end in itself. This difference in perspective is not insignificant because it informs the policy choices made in Moscow. It is significant because United States policymakers either do not perceive the situation in the same way or have chosen to reject the Soviet reading as misinformed.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

If American and Soviet leaders agree on the Kremlin's need for a sustained reduction in global tensions, but disagree on the centrality of superpower relations to that process, the Bush administration's policy toward the Soviet Union could be headed for trouble.

United States policy assumes that improved United States—Soviet relations matter more to Moscow than to Washington. It also assumes that a new détente of the kind Gorbachev has proposed cannot be secured without the willing cooperation of the United States. This accounts in part for the relative passivity of the Bush administration's present course. It also helps to explain why the incentive structure described above, although it is a reasonable representation of reality, may be dangerously misleading.

Assuming for purposes of argument that the an
(Continued on page 357)

¹²Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Mongolia at the conclusion of his meetings with Chinese leaders in Beijing on February 4, 1989; see *Pravda*, February 5, 1989, p. 4. Gorbachev revealed the plans to retire 500 Soviet tactical nuclear warheads during his meeting with Secretary of State Baker in Moscow on May 11, 1989; see *The New York Times*, May 12, 1989.

¹³*The New York Times*, May 25, 1989, and May 30, 1989.

Coit D. Blacker is a member of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control. He is the author of *Reluctant Warriors: The United States, the Soviet Union and Arms Control* (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1987).

"Perestroika at home requires better relations with the West, and the far-flung countries of the third world would seem a likely place to signal Soviet intentions. . . . We are likely to see a Soviet Union that will consider its political and economic liabilities in making decisions about third world involvement."

"New Thinking" and Soviet Third World Policy

BY CAROL R. SAIVETZ

Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts University

IN March, 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev acceded to power as Communist party General Secretary, the Soviet Union was deeply embroiled in Afghanistan, its relations with most of the Asian states were stagnant and its major clients in the Middle East were Syria and Libya. Additionally, Cuban troops were propping up the government of Angola; the pro-Soviet Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was faced with increased resistance from the contra rebels; and the high hopes that the Sandinista revolution would spread to other Central American states had been dashed. Indeed, the heady successes of the 1970's had all but vanished as Soviet clients faced insurgencies and Moscow proved economically unable and unwilling to aid its third world allies.

Within the first year of the Gorbachev era, it became clear that Moscow's new third world policy had changed. Gorbachev's speech at the Communist party's twenty-seventh congress (February, 1986) left no doubt that the new General Secretary was far less interested in the third world than his predecessors. President Leonid Brezhnev used to boast of the Soviet Union's great successes in the developing world, but Gorbachev devoted a scant few sentences to them. He declared that Afghanistan was a "bleeding sore," thereby signaling a shift in Soviet policy there.

The history of Soviet foreign policy since 1985 bears out these initial observations. As early as the summer of 1985, the Kremlin began a dialogue with Israel aimed at restoring the diplomatic relations severed in the aftermath of the 1967 Middle East War. In July, 1986, while in Vladivostok, Gorbachev outlined a new Asian policy. And, in 1987, the Soviet Union joined the bandwagon to support the Central American peace plan. In 1988,

Moscow's seriousness about an Afghan withdrawal became clear and, in that same year, pressure was brought to bear on Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasir Arafat to alter the PLO's policy toward Israel. At the same time, Gorbachev urged a form of perestroika (economic restructuring) on Soviet clients Vietnam and Cuba and he undertook serious talks with the Cubans about conditions for a pullout from Angola. In all, Gorbachev's other pronouncements, as supported by the new political thinking (*novoe myshlenie*), indicated that he hoped to cut Soviet losses in the third world and to eliminate, if possible, areas of potential confrontation with the United States. Yet Gorbachev's policies make it clear that Moscow intends to remain involved in the third world.

At first, Gorbachev's nonideological approach to international politics was not readily apparent. His early speeches warned about the nuclear threat and stressed peaceful coexistence; but by the time of the twenty-seventh party congress, the new General Secretary was underscoring common human values and arguing that ideological differences should not be translated into interstate relations. This humanistic approach contrasts with the traditional view that the class struggle operates in international politics. Although there is still formal opposition to this formulation, *novoe myshlenie* seems ascendant.¹ The new vision of international politics stresses cooperation and peaceful competition. Soviet spokesmen emphasize that this is a nonconfrontational approach, while Soviet academics have begun writing about a "balance of interests."

The new conceptualization of international relations extends to Soviet policy in the third world. Significantly, Soviet theorists now admit that involvement in the third world—aid to radical regimes and support for insurgencies—impinged on the superpower relationship. In the words of historian Vyacheslav Dashichev:

We were wrong in assessing the global situation. . . . Though we were politically, militarily (via weapons supplies and advisers) and diplomatically involved in

¹In the summer of 1988, Yegor Ligachev declared that the class struggle should remain the basis for international relations. He was answered by Aleksandr Yakovlev, a Gorbachev supporter and head of the new commission on international affairs of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, who asserted that class interests should not be set against all other interests and values. See, for example, *Pravda*, August 13, 1988.

regional conflicts, we disregarded their influence on the relaxation of tension between the U.S.S.R. and the West. . . . [Soviet] interest lay by no means in chasing petty and essentially formal gains associated with leadership coups in certain countries.²

Taking a slightly different approach, the authors of an article in *International Affairs* criticized the spread of the East-West confrontation to the third world. They continued:

It has to be admitted that . . . the continuing direct and indirect Soviet support for some forces and regimes in the third world prone to use force to settle international problems prompted propagandistic accusations that the Soviet Union was bent on expansion and intended to use the lessening of tensions in Europe to gain an edge on the West in the third world. Involved in the "zero option game" but not possessing a comparable material basis we became bogged down in economic and military rivalry with the U.S.A. in the third world.³

Taken together, these statements form a scathing indictment of previous Soviet foreign policy for political, economic and ideological reasons. Politically, Soviet support for third world radicals and the latter's involvement in regional conflicts perpetuated confrontational policies that Moscow now acknowledges were dangerous. Economically, Brezhnev's third world policy led to wasted resources and a ten-year-plus period in which energies could have been devoted to internal Soviet economic development. Ideologically, the new approach to the third world raises the issue of whether or not the Kremlin should continue to support indigenous Marxist-Leninist groups.

In this connection, Soviet academics in this era of glasnost are reexamining third world political processes. For years, Soviet scholars debated among themselves about the "progressiveness" of various third world states: Were they on the non-

²Vyacheslav Dashichev, "East-West: Quest for New Relations," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, May 18, 1988, p. 14 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Soviet Union Daily Report* (hereafter, FBIS), 88-098, May 20, 1988, pp. 7-8.

³Andrei Kozyrev and Andrei Shumikhin, "East and West in the Third World," *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 3 (1989), p. 68.

⁴See for example two of the more recent works on the Soviet debates about the third world: Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986) and Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

⁵Kozyrev and Shumikhin, op. cit., p. 66.

⁶Vladimir Lee and Georgi Mirski, "Socialist Orientation and New Political Thinking," *Asia and Africa Today* (English edition), no. 4 (1988), pp. 68-69.

⁷Lee and Mirski, op. cit., p. 65.

⁸I. Zevelev and A. Kara-Murza, "Sudby sotsializma i afro-aziatski mir" (The fate of socialism and Afro-Asian peace), *Aziya i afrika segodnya* (Asia and Africa Today), no. 1 (1989).

capitalist path of development? Were they socialist-oriented regimes? What kinds of development strategies should these states follow? The resulting polemics were long-winded, often elliptical in their reasoning and rather esoteric. Much has been written elsewhere about these academic debates.⁴ It is important to note that many of the prescriptions offered to third world elites derived from the Soviet model. Yet if the acknowledged legacies of Stalinism (overcentralization and bureaucratization) have created long-term economic and political problems for the Soviet Union, then the implied applicability of the Soviet model to radical third world states needs to be questioned as well. The authors of the *International Affairs* article cited above state,

Ignoring the fundamental Leninist idea that the Eastern countries were awakening to independent life, we simplistically viewed these countries as objects of our influence which had to follow our example.⁵

Georgi Mirski, a long-time third world specialist at the Institute for World Economics and International Relations, added that the socialist-oriented states suffer from

economic mismanagement, red tape, low labor productivity, low profitability of state-owned factories, excessive growth of managerial staff and shortages of consumer goods for the population.⁶

This might just as well apply to the Soviet Union

The downgrading of the radicals' successes in socialist-oriented development coincides with Gorbachev's effort to reduce the Soviet Union's economic and political liabilities. With the frank admission of Soviet economic realities, Moscow is rethinking its commitment to these states. While they argued that Moscow was not abandoning its socialist responsibilities, several scholars claimed that the Soviet Union's very existence was a form of support; they added that it is wrong for these regimes to expect the "world socialist system . . . to shoulder the bulk" of the burden.⁷ And two orientals noted that while the Soviet Union can help the radical third world with its military and political survival, the Soviet Union

cannot become the full guarantee of their movement to new societal means of production because of its own economic-technological backwardness and serious deformities in social order.⁸

This kind of reasoning provides the Soviet Union with a less-than-graceful exit from the third world.

NEW THINKING IN ACTION

Perhaps the most glaring example of Gorbachev's new policy is the Soviet withdrawal

from Afghanistan. Having endured nine years of guerrilla war, the Soviet Union is finally rid of its "bleeding sore." Despite Gorbachev's willingness to end the Afghan adventure, it was not until the winter of 1988 that he announced that a Soviet withdrawal could begin May 15, if a United Nations-sponsored agreement among Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and the Soviet Union could be reached by March. Until the withdrawal, Moscow continued to promise not to abandon its ally and conducted a well-orchestrated propaganda drive to portray outsiders as the cause of Afghanistan's troubles. Although the original deadline was not met, the negotiations proceeded. In April, Gorbachev met with Afghan President Najibullah in Tashkent, where they agreed on the terms of a withdrawal. And then in May, the four parties to the United Nations proximity talks agreed to a withdrawal plan.

As the withdrawal proceeded, the mujahideen guerrillas stepped up their attacks to the point that the Soviet government announced a temporary halt to the withdrawal in November, 1988. Nonetheless, the withdrawal was completed on time — by February 15, 1989. Yet the Soviet headache is not completely cured because mujahideen attacks continue and it is unclear how long the central Communist government in Kabul can survive.

Ideologically, Moscow has cut its commitment to the Najibullah regime; Gorbachev has more than once declared that the future of Afghanistan is its own. Militarily, however, although the Soviet troops have withdrawn, military supply airlifts continue. Moreover, Yuli Vorontsov, whose list of credentials includes Soviet deputy foreign minister, ambassador to Kabul and chief Middle East troubleshooter, is pursuing negotiations with the several mujahideen groups to avoid all-out civil war. As of this writing, there is no agreement on a coalition government, but the Kabul regime has thus far held the cities under siege.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Another area of Soviet foreign policy that has seen significant change is the Middle East. Although Moscow has always proclaimed Israel's right to exist, it remained staunchly supportive of the Arab cause. Yet by 1985, Soviet fortunes in the region had definitely plummeted. As noted above, the Soviet Union had no diplomatic relations with Israel and poor relations at best with Egypt. At the

same time, its two closest allies were Libya and Syria. Moreover, in terms of the then-five-year-old Persian Gulf War, the Kremlin was forced to play a careful balancing act in its relations with Iran and Iraq and to weigh the war's impact on the regional superpower balance. In addition, the war's divisive impact on the rest of the Middle East scuttled Moscow's efforts to rally Arab forces against the United States and Israel.⁹

Thus, a few months after becoming General Secretary, Gorbachev initiated a new approach to the Middle East. In July, 1985, then Soviet Ambassador to France Yuli Vorontsov met with his Israeli counterpart at the home of pianist Daniel Barenboim. Reportedly, Vorontsov suggested that relations could be reestablished with Israel if Israel were to withdraw from part of the Golan Heights. Discussions also touched on the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel.¹⁰ Despite strong opposition to this courtship from the Israeli right wing and from Moscow's Arab allies, Gorbachev has persisted. Several meetings have taken place since July, 1985. In July, 1987, an official Soviet delegation arrived in Israel for a three-month stay, ostensibly to inventory Russian church properties, and a year later an Israeli delegation was permitted to visit Moscow. These moves have been paralleled by the easing of emigration restrictions and the opening of a Jewish cultural center in Moscow.

That Gorbachev is serious in his intention to implement a new approach to the Arab-Israeli dispute may be seen in his dealings with Arab clients. When Syria's President Hafez Assad traveled to the Soviet Union in April, 1987, he was told by Gorbachev that the absence of relations between Tel Aviv and Moscow was not normal.¹¹ Yet although it was clear that Gorbachev hoped Assad would change Syrian policy, the military connection between Moscow and Damascus remains in place.

A year later, when Yasir Arafat visited Moscow, the Soviet desire for a more even-handed approach was again apparent. At a Kremlin reception, Gorbachev lectured Arafat that Israel was also concerned about its security and borders.¹² More recently, the PLO was reportedly pressured to alter fundamentally its stand on the nonrecognition of Israel. Following the Palestine National Congress's historic meeting in Algiers in November, 1988, Yasir Arafat announced that the PLO would accept United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 and that it was anxious to pursue negotiations with Israel. At the same time, Moscow has rhetorically supported the Palestinian intifada (uprising) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and it has criticized Israeli intransigence with regard to the apparent changes in PLO policy.

During this same period, the Soviet Union pur-

⁹See Carol R. Saivetz, *The Soviet Union and the Gulf in the 1980's* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

¹⁰Jerusalem Domestic Service, July 19, 1985, in FBIS, 85-139, July 19, 1985, pp. H1-H2.

¹¹*Pravda*, April 25, 1987, p. 2.

¹²*Pravda*, April 10, 1988, p. 1.

sued its policy of balancing its long-standing, if somewhat attenuated, ties to Iraq with its desire to use the late Iranian Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's anti-Americanism.¹³ Simultaneously, Moscow reached out to the other Gulf states and established diplomatic relations with Oman and the United Arab Emirates for the first time. Soviet ties with Saudi Arabia were strengthened, although formal relations have yet to be established. In an important move, the Soviet Union responded to Kuwait's request to both superpowers to help protect its shipping through the Gulf: the Kremlin leased three tankers to the Kuwaitis.

Since Kuwait supported Iraq in the Gulf War, the lease arrangement, which was dictated in part by long-standing ties between Kuwait and the Soviet Union, further complicated Moscow's balancing act in the region. The Kuwaiti deal came as the United Nations Security Council agreed to take action on the Gulf War. In July, the Security Council passed Resolution 598 that called on the combatants to observe an immediate cease-fire and to withdraw to internationally recognized boundaries. The resolution also authorized United Nations supervision of the cease-fire and, finally, it sought to establish an investigatory commission to determine culpability in the Gulf War.

Moscow, taking advantage of the world community's growing ostracism of Iran, approved the resolution, but refused to vote to impose sanctions on Teheran. It also pursued closer economic relations with Iran and seemed to shift toward the Iranian interpretation of Resolution 598—that the investigatory commission should be convened before the cease-fire. Although the Soviet shift toward Teheran strained the new relations with the Arab Gulf states and irritated the Kuwaitis in particular, the pro-Iranian tilt has been maintained. Moscow welcomed the Iran-Iraq War cease-fire agreement of August, 1988, and took advantage of the relative calm in the Gulf to intensify contacts with Teheran.

In February, 1989, the Gorbachev imprint on Soviet policy in the Middle East was visible anew. In a high-profile trip to the Middle East, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met with Arab and Israeli leaders and with Iraqi President Sad-

dam Hussein in Baghdad and the Ayatollah Khomeini in Teheran. Shevardnadze worked to sustain the momentum in Soviet-Israeli relations and to garner support for an international conference on the Middle East as well as for a withdrawal of United States and Soviet ships from the Gulf. Finally, having strengthened its ties to Teheran, Moscow stood to benefit from the uproar over Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* by offering to mediate between the Ayatollah and the West.* Shevardnadze's trip indicated that Soviet leaders wanted to take advantage of the changing Middle Eastern situation to end its own diplomatic isolation.

AFRICA

In general, the Soviet Union's successes in Africa in the 1970's had by the mid-1980's become Moscow's headaches. The decision by the United States to aid guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita) meant that Cuban troops were still needed to defend the Marxist government in Luanda; Mozambique, despite the 1984 Nkomati Accords between Maputo and Pretoria, was on the verge of collapse; and, after having received massive amounts of Western food aid, Ethiopia was continuing to use food and military force to fight Eritrean and Tigrean separatists. In contrast, South Africa was perhaps the one ray of hope, as African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas stepped up their attacks on symbols of white supremacy. It should be noted, however, that Soviet goals in South Africa are unclear, as is the extent of Moscow's influence over the ANC.

In Angola, the costs of the Cuban-Soviet joint intervention grew as the operation, begun in 1975, intensified. In 1984-1985 and again in 1986-1987, Soviet arms transfers to Angola increased significantly including MiG-23's and Mi-24 helicopter gunships. According to several observers, in the fall of 1985 and again in 1987 the offensives evidenced a more activist Soviet role in fighting Savimbi's forces.¹⁴ When the operation in the fall of 1987 failed, South Africa was prompted to launch an offensive of its own. In early 1988, with increasing logistical support from the Soviet Union, Cuban troops inflicted serious losses on South African forces. The escalation of the fighting added new urgency to the United States-brokered talks among

(Continued on page 354)

¹³In the first two years of the war, when Iraqi troops occupied Iranian territory, the Soviet Union held up its arms supply to Baghdad and seemed to favor Iran. (Concomitantly, Moscow permitted its Warsaw Treaty allies to provide Iraq with much needed spare parts to keep the Saddam Hussein government supplied.) When Iranian troops crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982, the Kremlin renewed its arms shipments to Iraq.

*The furor that erupted in the Muslim world in the spring of 1989 when Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini ordered Muslims to kill Rushdie for the blasphemy in his novel, *The Satanic Verses*.

¹⁴See Peter Clement, "The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa: A Balance Sheet," in Carol R. Saivetz, ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

Carol R. Saivetz is a research fellow at Harvard University's Russian Research Center. She is the author of *The Soviet Union and the Gulf in the 1980's* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) and the editor of *The Soviet Union in the Third World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

"Given his political adroitness and his determination to succeed, [Soviet President Mikhail] Gorbachev may yet manage to revamp and revitalize the Soviet economic system. It is critical that he succeed, for it is in the economic reform field that Gorbachev will ultimately be judged."

The Future of Soviet Economic Reform

BY MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

Kathryn W. Davis Professor of Soviet Economics, Wellesley College

THERE is a widespread agreement that economic reform, or perestroika, is at the core of President Mikhail Gorbachev's program to remake the Soviet Union. You need not be an economic determinist to argue that almost everything Gorbachev has proposed affecting the Soviet Union's foreign, military, sociological and domestic political policies stems in one way or another from his realization that such changes are essential if perestroika is to succeed. That does not guarantee, of course, that if such changes are implemented, perestroika will of necessity be realized; it does mean, however, that Gorbachev feels he must revolutionize almost all aspects of Soviet life to provide the proper climate for the economic changes he wants.

If there is no economic reform, the Soviet Union will not only lose its place as a world political and military power but is likely to suffer serious public unrest as well. Unfortunately, Gorbachev does not have much time. He has openly acknowledged, for example, that "by the beginning of the 1980's . . . the country found itself in a state of severe crisis which has embraced all spheres of life [emphasis added]."¹

Although Gorbachev's perceptions of how serious his problems are, particularly in the economy, have deepened over time,² it is worth noting that he began to talk about the need for some type of economic reform within the first few weeks of becoming the party's General Secretary. While Gorbachev was not the first Soviet leader to attempt to reform the Soviet economy, he was the first leader since Joseph Stalin to attach such an important priority to that effort. As a consequence, Gorbachev had relatively little precedent to follow. Reform turned out to be a

"trial and error" process; unfortunately, the number of errors often seemed to match the number of trials.

Equally important, in many cases the errors were not easily rectified. Many of them had the effect of undermining subsequent reform efforts. This has led to a further deterioration in the Soviet economy. Gorbachev himself has acknowledged what he has wrought. As he noted in a speech to the Congress of People's Deputies in May, 1989, "There have been great errors and major miscalculations . . . they need not have been. I am concerned as you are." Then, in a revealing aside, he added, "I do not think you suspect me of wanting things to be worse."³

Obviously, few believe that Gorbachev's mistakes have been deliberate. Nevertheless, more and more Soviet citizens have begun to blame him for what they see as the deterioration in Soviet economic conditions. What went wrong? How bad is the economic situation? And to what extent can this deterioration be blamed on Gorbachev himself?

DEJA VU AGAIN

With great fanfare, Gorbachev tried to establish his reform program at a Communist party plenum in April, 1985, barely a month after his selection as General Secretary. As Gorbachev began to spell out his program, it seemed earnest enough, but more and more of it seemed like bits and pieces from the past and, for the most part, not very impressive pieces. As Yogi Berra might have said, "It was déjà vu all over again."

In fairness to Gorbachev and his influential adviser, Abel Aganbegian, some of the ideas made sense. Many other suggestions, however, were measures that had been proposed earlier with no noticeable or lasting impact. Indeed, until approximately mid-1987, there was little initiated by Gorbachev in the economic sphere that could be considered novel or innovative. For that matter, the Soviet press continued to criticize almost all aspects of the economic reforms in China that were creative and different.⁴ That warped perception was undoubtedly damaging because it probably made it

¹*Pravda*, May 31, 1989, p. 1; Marshall I. Goldman, *The U.S.S.R. in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982).

²Originally Gorbachev used the word "pre-crisis" in *Izvestia*, June 26, 1989, p. 3.

³Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Soviet Union Daily Report* (hereafter FBIS), May 26, 1989, p. 19.

⁴Marshall I. Goldman, "Soviet Perceptions of Chinese Economic Reforms," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 34, no. 2 (Winter, 1986), p. 41.

difficult to propose the adoption of similar measures. Coincidentally, it was only in mid-1986, when Soviet officials switched from criticism to praise of the Chinese reforms, that Gorbachev's proposals for economic reforms became in any way nontraditional.

Soon after assuming office, Gorbachev began to speak of economic restructuring. However, it turned out that for the most part he meant the revitalization of the machine tool industry. He spoke of "intensification and *uskorenie* (acceleration)." In fact, he wanted more efficient and more innovative machine tool production. This was to be accomplished in part by increased investment and spending from the national budget along with the reorganization and consolidation of the ministries dealing with machine tool production. Aganbegian, for example, continued to stress the importance of heavy industry, which is referred to in the Soviet Union as sector A industry.⁵ The additional funding going to the machine tool industry would be supervised by newly created superministries that were established in the early months of the Gorbachev administration.⁶ It was expected that by combining ministries, there would be less red tape and smaller bureaucracies. Presumably, with fewer officials in Moscow to interfere with production, enterprise managers would be forced to assume more initiative in their own affairs.

There is something about the intellectual and ideological climate in the Soviet Union that associates economic prowess and leadership with an emphasis on the machine tool industry and the production of more machine tools, especially big ones. Certainly that has been the prevailing attitude since Stalin, and there were traces of similar thinking in Lenin as well. This attitude may be the consequence of the Soviet Union's economic backwardness as well as the enormous size of the country. Soviet leaders tend to be beguiled by what they refer to as gigantomania. If it is not the biggest, it doesn't count. It is a little like coming from Texas. Also, in fairness, before World War II, the strength of the country's machine tool industry was a measure of its economic prowess.

Unfortunately, the fact that other sectors of the economy like the electronics industry and durable consumer goods industries have become more important measures of success was not understood by recent Soviet economic leaders and thinkers. They

were slow in absorbing the lessons of the economic miracle of East Asia, where machine tool production played a relatively minor role. As a result, Gorbachev added to the expenditures for the production of industrial products, but he did little or nothing in the way of increasing the stock of goods available for purchase by those who produced those machine tools.

Inevitably, this increased the overhang of rubles floating around the economy with no place to go. For example, from 1986 to 1988, investment exceeded the plan target by 19 billion rubles.⁷ Similarly, in 1986 and 1987, budget expenditures increased by 44.4 billion rubles, while national income rose only by 21.1 billion rubles.

SOCIAL REFORMS

Along with these organizational changes, Gorbachev also introduced a set of social reforms. Picking up from some of the campaigns introduced in 1982-1983 by his mentor and General Secretary, Yuri Andropov, Gorbachev put renewed emphasis on workplace discipline. He also resurrected the anti-alcohol campaign. This was aimed at reducing waste and absenteeism in the workplace. As a by-product, there was also a noticeable reduction in the crime and divorce rates.

However, there were several unanticipated negative consequences. When those who wanted a bottle of vodka had difficulty buying it in the state stores, they switched their patronage to moonshiners. In addition, not only did the consumption of more moonshine have an adverse effect on the drinker's health, the difficulty of procuring a drink spawned bitter resentment toward Gorbachev. This sentiment was particularly strong among members of the lower income groups, who tended to be the heaviest drinkers. It also led to the disappearance of sugar from the stores, because the moonshine operators needed it for their distilling.

Moreover, the fall of state sales of vodka resulted not only in a decline in the goods sold by the state to consumers (about 37 billion rubles in 1985 or one-fourth of the value of all food sales), but also a decline of approximately 36 billion-39 billion rubles in sales tax revenue over a three-year period.⁸ As a result, what was undoubtedly good social policy proved to be poor economic policy. The loss of tax revenue added significantly to the inflationary pressure that had always been a serious but for the most part hidden force.

Several other "reform" edicts issued in Gorbachev's early years have also been subjected to reappraisal. For instance, in late 1986, Soviet authorities introduced a new quality inspection program called *gospriemka*. Beginning in November, 1987, a newly created State Acceptance Service sent out in-

⁵*Sotsialisticheskaya industriya*, January 5, 1988, p. 2.

⁶*Pravda*, October 18, 1985, p. 1.

⁷*Economicheskaya gazeta*, no. 5 (February, 1989), pp. 5, 15; *Moscow News*, no. 19 (1989), p. 4.

⁸*Economicheskaya gazeta*, no. 1 (1989), p. 10; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, January 25, 1989, p. 11; FBIS, January 31, 1989, p. 79; *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya*, January 29, 1989, p. 2.

spectors to 1,500 of the Soviet Union's largest manufacturing enterprises. These inspectors had the authority to accept or reject the enterprise's output. In the short run, at least, the program led to an increase in quality; enterprise managers found that producing in the old way meant the underfulfillment of the enterprise's quotas and the loss of managerial and labor bonuses.

After several months of such problems, however, the rejection of output because of poor quality diminished. That was not so much because of any quality revolution. Instead, it was a consequence of the gradual erosion of the inspection standards through bribes and other sociological pressures. What was peculiar about the *gospriemka* procedure was not so much that it soon proved to be relatively ineffective, but that it represented a rejection of the stated goal of moving away from centralized, heavily administered decision-making by Moscow. A decentralized approach would have utilized market incentives to solve the problem; usually those who make poor-quality goods in a market economy ultimately find that they cannot sell their merchandise.

However, in an economy like the Soviet Union's with a chronic shortage of goods, market forces operate ineffectively, if at all. They must be part of an overall reform effort that ends centralized domination of price-setting, investment, goods allocation and other aspects. If decentralized measures are to be effective, there must be a market in which there will be fluctuating prices, capital markets, bank borrowing, bankruptcy and ruble convertibility. While Gorbachev hinted periodically that he would like to see such a package of decentralized processes, he always added a disclaimer, saying that such measures would be slow in coming and only after there had been a chance to discuss such measures with the public.

Such policy contradictions and even retreats led to considerable confusion and sometimes economic dislocation. After several public discussions about the inevitability of price reform, probably by 1989, Gorbachev eventually backed away. Every time he raised the issue, even in a tentative way, he set off a run on the shops by consumers eager to buy before prices went up. This hoarding precipitated shortages that then laid the ground for price increases in the black market even before price reform.

Gorbachev's policies created confusion among those contemplating the formation of their own private and cooperative businesses. When Gorbachev began to hint at the possibility of less centralized control, some observers thought this would eventually lead to the legalization of private trade. Imagine the confusion, therefore, when it was suddenly announced that as of July 1, 1986, there would be a crackdown on all private trading activ-

ities. No one could sell anything that was made by another person. But how do you prove that you grew the carrots or flowers or manufactured the shirts you offer to sell?

The result was that private trade in general, even trade that was legal, was severely disrupted. The confusion was compounded a few months later, on November 19, 1986, when a subsequent decree announced that as of May 1, 1987, not quite a year after the crackdown, it would be legal to set up cooperative and private trade and manufacturing activities. Naturally, it was not too long before this led to the creation of the Law of the Cooperative. This new law in turn was circumscribed by new sets of regulations limiting what cooperatives could do and introducing fees and restrictions that frustrated all but the most determined and those willing to bribe their way around such restrictions.

It was in agriculture, however, that the most serious policy errors occurred. Rejecting the decentralized Chinese approach of breaking up the communes and returning the land to quasi-peasant ownership, Gorbachev decided instead to use a centralized system. In his superministry mindset, in November, 1985, he closed down six smaller ministries dealing with agriculture and created yet another superministry—*Gosagroprom* (the State Ministry for Agriculture and Industry). This was the Soviet equivalent of the agrobusiness approach that has proved to be so successful in the United States.

But *Gosagroprom* turned out to be a disaster. After the six ministries were abolished, no one knew who was responsible for what. Unfortunately, the bureaucrats who survived to run *Gosagroprom* soon discovered how much power they had and used it to frustrate any activity that was not subject to their immediate involvement. Thus it was widely conceded that when Gorbachev finally decided sometime in 1987 that he wanted to copy the Chinese approach and encourage private, family and cooperative farming, *Gosagroprom* did all it could to frustrate his effort.

Moreover, unlike their Chinese counterparts, Soviet peasants did not leap at the chance to break out of the commune. In part, this may reflect a cultural difference between the Chinese and the Soviet, especially Russian, peasants. More likely it is the peasant response to all Gorbachev's stops, starts and reversals; Soviet peasants are worried that Gorbachev may reverse himself yet again. Given the fact that he began so enthusiastically with *Gosagroprom* and centralized control, many Soviet peasants questioned how deeply Gorbachev was committed to the move away from the collective (*kolkhoz*) and state (*sovkhoz*) farms.

Nor, admittedly, were they reassured when final-

ly, in the spring of 1989, Gorbachev closed down *Gosagroprom*, only to create a smaller ministry in its place. Equally discouraging was Gorbachev's decision to appoint Yegor Ligachev, an acknowledged conservative and supporter of the *kolkhoz* and *sovkhos* farming system, to supervise Soviet agriculture. To the average peasant, this hardly reflected much determination to move toward more individual effort in agriculture.

Such a signal is needed, given the memory of how *kulaks* and middle-income farmers were treated during the collectivization drives of the 1920's and 1930's. Between 10 million and 20 million farmers and their families were uprooted from the farms, and many lost their lives. For that matter, there is a long tradition of opposition to income inequality in the Russian countryside as reflected in the following Russian story: A genie has three wishes to offer. The Englishman chooses a cottage overlooking the sea. The Frenchman asks for his vineyard and some mistresses. The Russian's wish, however, is simpler: "My neighbor has a goat: I don't have a goat. Kill my neighbor's goat."

TOWARD A MARKET ECONOMY

As the decision to allow private and cooperative farming indicates, little by little Gorbachev did in fact begin to propose some radical market reforms. Some of these reforms had not been seen since the 1920's and some were entirely new, at least for the Soviet Union. Many of these ideas were first proposed in 1987 and some emerge as Gorbachev continues to find that his earlier efforts have failed.

What Gorbachev and his advisers have referred to as the keystone of his reform effort, the Law of the Enterprise, was passed by the Supreme Soviet on July 30, 1987. As much as anything, this signaled Gorbachev's determination to move away from central planning and toward autonomy for the managers of the state enterprises. To be implemented in stages, this law became effective as of January, 1988, for enterprises producing 50 percent of the Soviet Union's industrial output. The law became effective for the rest of Soviet industry the following year, on January 1, 1989. Under the law, Soviet state-owned factories were supposed to begin to operate more independently. They were ordered to finance themselves. The goal was to eliminate operating subsidies from the state treasury. Plant expansion and higher wages would have to be earned. That presumably would force Soviet managers to operate more efficiently. Those who were unable to earn a profit would go bankrupt.

An equally important provision of the reform is that an enterprise is supposed to free itself gradually from the need to respond exclusively to the production orders handed down from *Gosplan*, the state

planning organization, or from individual ministries. This would allow the state enterprises to find their own, presumably more lucrative, customers in direct negotiations or in wholesale markets. Thus instead of receiving *fundy* (or product assignments) from Moscow, as of January, 1988, the enterprises were to be assigned state orders, *goszakazy*. Equivalent to the orders an American manufacturer receives from the Defense Department, the *goszakazy* for the first year were to be limited to something like 70 percent of an enterprise's total output. That would leave 30 percent of the factory's output for sale at higher prices elsewhere, including sales in foreign markets. With higher prices, the manager could increase wages and profits and, in some cases, could even spend more on imports.

Unfortunately, the Law of the Enterprise has so far proved to be a failure. *Goszakazy* continue to account for 90 percent or more of most enterprise output—in some cases over 100 percent. Given the back-and-forth nature of the Gorbachev reform effort, there is a serious credibility problem about how deeply committed Gorbachev or his successors may be to any specific reform proposal. This hesitation on the part of those who designed the reforms as well as those who have to carry out the reforms has the effect of diminishing the results, which tends to create a credibility problem for other parts of the reform process. Thus, efforts that should produce results very often do not because they are implemented in a half-hearted fashion. No wonder that in some instances what should have been a major part of the solution has instead become a major part of the problem.

The gradual constriction of the cooperative movement is a good illustration of how ideological and bureaucratic foot-dragging crippled what should have been a logical reform effort. In the aftermath of the July, 1986, crackdown on private trade, it was only to be expected that the decision to authorize the creation of cooperatives the following year would come with strings attached. And, indeed, the Ministry of Finance made an immediate attempt to impose marginal tax rates of 90 percent on the profits of cooperative owners. But after a somewhat unexpected coalition of economists and cooperative owners mobilized to fight against what was seen as a killer tax, the Ministry of Finance retreated. This left a negligible tax of 13 percent that applied to virtually all Soviet enterprises.

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Marshall I. Goldman is associate director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. His most recent book is *Gorbachev's Challenge: Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987).

"[Soviet President Mikhail] Gorbachev wants to effect radical changes without rejecting the foundations of the [Soviet] system; his aim is a rejection of the Stalinist heritage in favor of the original socialist ideal of a highly productive, just society."

The Transition Era in Soviet Politics

BY LARS T. LIH

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Wellesley College

THE following joke was heard in Moscow in the spring of 1989, "veterans ride the last bus in Moscow and carry along some 'visual agitation': a portrait of Brezhnev covered with medals and a portrait of Gorbachev covered with ration coupons."¹

This joke shows that the Soviet population has not lost its talent for political humor, but it also illustrates two key features of the political situation in the Soviet Union today. The first is the growing popular outrage at the catastrophic economic situation. Perestroika has not only failed to improve the standard of living in a visible way, but it seems to be leading to unprecedented difficulties in obtaining basic consumer goods.

The second key feature of Soviet politics is that it has reached a stage of openness and independence that a year earlier seemed almost unimaginable. This is illustrated not so much by the joke itself as by the person who told it: President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Soviet jokes are meant to be told to a close circle of friends in someone's kitchen, but this one was told on national television when Gorbachev accepted his nomination as head of state in May, 1989. He had just sat through more pointed personal and political criticism than any Soviet leader since Lenin.

The question confronting the Soviet Union today is whether the creative potential released by political reform will be enough to overcome the bitterness and conflict aggravated by growing economic hardship. This contradiction of Soviet politics dominated the central event of the year: the Congress of People's Deputies that began its work in May, 1989.

The important dates in the political history of the Soviet Union have always been meetings of the Communist party: congresses, conferences and gatherings of the top party committees. Not since the civil war (1918-1921) has a meeting of a legislature elected by all Soviet citizens and not just by party members had any real significance because these bodies have merely rubber-stamped decisions

made by the party. Yet the first session of the newly created Congress of People's Deputies has already dwarfed in importance the two party meetings of the Gorbachev era: the twenty-seventh party congress in 1986 and the nineteenth party conference in 1988. The shift of the political center of gravity from party bodies to the state legislature marks a fundamental change in Soviet politics.

Nevertheless, the creation of the new legislature proceeded in the traditional way, through decisions made by the top party leadership. In the summer of 1988 at the nineteenth party conference, Gorbachev announced without prior discussion a proposal to create a new type of state legislature to replace the rubber-stamp Supreme Soviet. To put it in American terms, the new Congress would be something like an electoral college with brains: the voters would directly elect most members of the Congress, which in turn would elect not only the head of state but a smaller working legislature (to be given the old name of Supreme Soviet). The Congress of People's Deputies would then retire from the scene, but it would reconvene at regular intervals to make basic decisions.

In the fall of 1988, a draft of the necessary changes in the Soviet constitution was announced and was submitted to "nationwide discussion." This is a time-honored device of the Soviet leadership—Joseph Stalin used it in 1936 when he introduced his own constitution. The government asks for suggestions and then does what it wants. But this time serious objections were raised by citizens who realized that constitutional language was becoming meaningful and not just window-dressing. Some of these objections—particularly those from the non-Russian republics who believed that the new changes weakened their right to autonomy—led to changes in the constitutional amendments.

The old Supreme Soviet dutifully (but not unanimously) rubber-stamped its own demise, and the protracted process of elections began. Only two-thirds of the seats were elected by the entire population divided by territorial districts; the rest of the seats were handed out to "social organizations" ranging from the Communist party to the Academy

¹*Pravda*, May 26, 1989.

of Sciences and even to religious groups. This procedure allowed the party leadership to control a solid bloc of 100 handpicked delegates, but it also allowed many independent voices that might not have been otherwise elected. A majority of the territorial elections were contested by more than one candidate — another first in a year of many changes. Although the complicated election procedure allowed room for manipulation, the Soviet population could see the difference between a real, even if manipulated, election and the meaningless farce of earlier years.

The televised proceedings of the Congress opened in May, 1989, and kept the Soviet people glued to their sets. (Later in the year, the meeting of the new Supreme Soviet was not televised because, it was claimed, excessive viewing by absentee workers was damaging the national economy.) The proceedings of the Congress were often hectic and confused — a symbol of the difficulty of finding new ways of relating to one another in a freer society. The actual business of the Congress was not extensive: Gorbachev was elected as the new President (technically, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet), and around one-fourth of the People's Deputies were chosen as members of the new, more independent Supreme Soviet. Some changes were made in recent legislation; for example, the Congress deleted a clause that seemed to make criticism of government officials a crime.²

The more profound accomplishment of the Congress (and the previous electoral campaign) was to educate the country about itself. A month earlier, Gorbachev had admitted that when the reform era began in 1985, "none of us had a good knowledge of the country in which we live."³ The logic of glasnost — that social self-knowledge can only come from open and vigorous debate — was carried a step further.

Sometimes it seemed that the main lesson learned was the extent of the conflicts within Soviet society. Speakers from various nationalities railed at each other: Armenians versus Azerbaijanis, Russians versus Balts. Regional tensions surfaced, especially in the indignation directed at the "Moscow group" of deputies who seemed to be looking down on the provinces. Class conflict was no less important: the workers resented the intellectuals, and both groups resented the "apparatchiks" — the full-time party officials.

The emotional high points of the proceedings were two stirring denunciations. The first came from a champion weight lifter, Yuri Vlasov, who

now took on an even heavier weight — the KGB (Committee for State Security). His passionate denunciation of its malignant influence marked the beginning of a new accountability for the secret police. The head of the KGB faced sharp questioning before the new Supreme Soviet ratified his appointment. The other outburst was directed against human rights activist Andrei Sakharov for his condemnation of the Soviet conduct of the war in Afghanistan. Although few would defend the war today, many veterans feel about Sakharov the way some American Vietnam War veterans feel about Jane Fonda. Sakharov's statements were often drowned out by the hostile majority, and at one point his microphone was cut off. The incident showed that democracy requires not only a change in political structures but also a change in habitual norms of behavior.

The Congress took note of three events in the outside world that seemed like warnings. The first was another outbreak of interethnic violence, this time between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in eastern Uzbekistan in June, 1989. Gorbachev took the Congress into closed session to discuss this problem. That same day there was a horrifying railway accident in the Ural mountains, when an explosion of a gas line caused at least 500 deaths. The underlying cause of the accident was the self-destructive "who cares?" attitude that may be the most devastating legacy of President Leonid Brezhnev's era of stagnation. The Congress also took note of the massacre in Tiananmen Square in China — a sobering reminder of the potential for violence if the reform process fails.

After the Congress completed its work, there was widespread dissatisfaction. In the words of one Soviet writer, "the people of this country changed a little in those two weeks. But their surroundings remained unchanged, and therefore seemed even worse than before."⁴ This dissatisfaction might be the result of higher standards, or it might be the result of inexperience with the possibilities of independent politics.

But beyond the ventilation of conflicts, a more constructive learning process had been taking place. Because of the passionate complaints of delegates about the hardships faced by their constituents and because of the speeches made by government officials outlining the extent of the country's financial difficulties, the country was forced to face the full dimensions of the economic crisis. Various economic reform strategies were seriously debated and many observers believed that mutual learning and consensus were more feasible in economic than in political or social matters. Open disagreement among the leaders politicized the viewing public. Difficult choices lay

²For discussion of the new law on state crimes, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (cited as *CDSP*), vol. 41, no. 15 (1989).

³*Pravda*, April 27, 1989.

⁴Igor Klyamkin, *Moscow News*, no. 27 (1989), p. 12.

ahead. Of these choices, the most fundamental is the role of the Communist party.

THE PARTY WITHERS AWAY?

The Communist party plays the "leading role" in Soviet society (or, perhaps a better translation, it plays the role of leader). Western students have always had difficulty understanding this vague formula; it is now evident that the Soviet population has the same difficulty. The difficulty is more acute because the party's counterparts (rivals? partners?) — state and society — are being strengthened by the reforms, leaving the party's role more mysterious, even to the party itself.

The strengthening of the state is justified by a slogan from the 1917 revolution: "All Power to the Soviets!" The Russian word *soviet* means "council," and in this context it stands for local and national representative bodies elected by the whole population. Gorbachev wants to invigorate both the local *soviets* (city and regional councils) and the central state legislatures, as shown by the Congress of People's Deputies itself.

Gorbachev has proposed a rule that the local head of the party also be the head of the corresponding *soviet*. At the national level, this means that Gorbachev himself — who until the fall of 1988 held only the office of party leader without any state office — now combines the offices of party leader and head of state. No one knows how this amalgamation of party and state offices will work in practice, but one possible outcome is that any party leader who does not get a popular mandate will have to resign — thus giving the general electorate some control over the party.

The Soviet state is also being strengthened, paradoxically, by its limitations. The economic reforms aim to limit the state by taking away as much responsibility as possible for economic decisions. The political reforms aim at self-limitation through the concept of a "law-governed state" that would operate on the principle that everything that is not explicitly forbidden is permitted. These reforms will not only protect the citizens from the state, they will also protect the state from the interference of the party.

Soviet society is also receiving the opportunity to protect itself by forming independent new groups. The most active and vigorous of the groups express national grievances; in the Baltic republics, the newly formed popular fronts have taken the initiative from the local party organizations. Russian

nationalists have responded with organizations of their own to defend the rights of Russians living in the national republics, and to preserve old cultural monuments and protect the Russian countryside from ecological abuse. Organizations to advance and promote economic interests have also been formed, particularly by the unpopular, embattled urban cooperatives.

In a time of transition, confusion and uncertainty reign. Should organizations rejecting the Soviet system be allowed (for example, the Democratic Union)? Should the extremist, anti-Semitic *Pamyat* (Memory) society be given a hall when it wants to hold a meeting? How should the police handle street demonstrations, especially in tense and explosive situations?

A demonstration in Tbilisi, Georgia, was tragically mishandled; toxic gas was used, people died and ethnic divisions were inflamed. Many party officials are exasperated by the activities of the new groups and find them a convenient scapegoat. But Gorbachev is insisting that "today we should not concern ourselves with slowing popular initiative and grass-roots activity. The party's task is to head up the process of the growth of the people's public activeness."⁵

An invigorated state and society have raised the prospect that the party may wither away to become a "debating club" on the margins of social change. Many party leaders performed badly in the elections for the Congress of People's Deputies, not only because they were blamed (in their view, unfairly) for the economic crisis, but also because they did not know how to handle the new atmosphere of open, competitive politics. Gorbachev was unsympathetic to their loud complaints:

Some of our party committees find themselves in the position of a commander whose regiment or division has launched an offensive while he himself still can't get out of his trench — he keeps slipping back into it, he can't find a foothold and so just sits there in the trench, although it's time to join the offensive.⁶

All these developments move the question of change in the one-party system from a taboo status and place it squarely at the center of political discussion. One poll of over 600 delegates to the Congress showed that 42 percent were in favor of ending the one-party system (as opposed to 44 percent who defended it).⁷ The party has had to defend its privileged position as never before. Party leaders have argued that a multiparty system is no guarantee of democracy. The Communist party has made mistakes in the past, but it deserves credit for admitting past failures and beginning the reform process. It remains the only force that could carry out the reforms against the resistance of the en-

⁵*Pravda*, April 27, 1989, translated in *CDSP*, vol. 41, no. 19 (1989), p. 15.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷Poll conducted by Mnenie, and reported in *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Literary Journal), June 21, 1989, p. 11.

trenched bureaucrats. In Gorbachev's words:

The party acts as a source of political initiative for social development. In [the midst of the] social processes which are unfolding, and which are being accompanied by discussions, quests and diversity of opinion, and, I shall put it bluntly, centrifugal tendencies, the party's integrating role is irreplaceable.⁸

There are several observations about this new rationale. There is no claim to any special wisdom guaranteed by "scientific communism"—such a claim would sound bizarre today. The argument that the party will resist centrifugal forces seems to imply that to some extent it remains resistant to democracy (and that this resistance may indeed be necessary). Finally, the party's leadership role is temporary; this implies that the party will retain its privileged role only for the duration of the transition period. The party is beginning to sound like a colonial administration that promises independence in the future—as soon as the natives are ready.

FOUR LEADERS

Not long ago, specialists in Soviet politics were called "kremlinologists" because so much of politics consisted of conflicts among the top party leaders with offices in the Kremlin. This is no longer the case. Soviet politics now finds its home not only in party offices but in the streets, in discussion clubs, in the national republics, in strike committees and newspaper editorial offices. While most national leaders are still party members, they gain their influence more and more not from their party position but because they represent a base of support in society. The main alternatives facing Soviet society can be discovered by examining the platform of the four most prominent names in Soviet politics, each of whom has just lived through a very dramatic year.

Boris Yeltsin's career over the last two years has aptly been described as a roller coaster.⁹ In 1986, he was party chief of Moscow and was sometimes called "Gorbachev's Gorbachev," since he stood out as one of the most enthusiastic party reformers. In the fall of 1987, his career appeared to have been abruptly terminated when Gorbachev felt he was being erratic and disloyal; Yeltsin was thus unceremoniously removed from his party posts.

But instead of disappearing, as disgraced party leaders did in the old days, Yeltsin remained visible and was elected to the nineteenth party conference. There he asked for "political rehabilitation," but all he received was a long, personal refutation of his claims by Gorbachev himself. However, Yeltsin was eventually rehabilitated, and in spectacular fashion; he ran for the Congress of People's Deputies and received almost 90 percent of the votes in a contested election in Moscow.

Part of Yeltsin's extraordinary popularity stemmed from his successful defiance of the party elite and his uncompromising defense of his principles. But his program also had a wide populist appeal, especially among the working class. Yeltsin voiced the strong popular revulsion against the privileges of the elite in the form of special shops, and access to medical care and to private summer homes. There had been an epidemic of corruption and personal aggrandizement during the rule of Leonid Brezhnev, and many leaders had been exposed under Gorbachev. When Brezhnev's son-in-law, Yuri Churbanov, was sentenced to 12 years in prison after a lengthy trial, there was an explosion of indignation at what was perceived as a scandalously light sentence. Yeltsin has managed to tap this hostility toward "the bosses."

Yeltsin has also charged that perestroika was being sabotaged by conservative elements in the Politburo, particularly in the person of Yegor Ligachev, who has become the symbol of misgivings about perestroika, if not outright opposition. Ligachev came to national prominence only after Brezhnev's departure, and he was a member of the leadership group that introduced the original package of economic reforms. He also had his ups and downs in 1989. At the nineteenth party conference, he self-confidently taunted Yeltsin. In September, 1988, however, he suffered a setback when Gorbachev's reshuffling of top party posts left him with a less prestigious position. Even though Ligachev was one of the Communist party's handpicked delegates and was running unopposed, he received a smaller percentage of the vote even in an internal party election than Yeltsin received in an open election. Ligachev has been accused of complicity in Brezhnev-era scandals, and Watergate-style accusations of cover-ups have been hurled back and forth between Ligachev and a pair of state investigators. The Congress formed a commission to look into these charges.¹⁰

(Continued on page 353)

⁸Dawn Mann in *Report on the U.S.S.R.*, vol. 1, no. 15 (1989), p. 11.

⁹Dawn Mann, "Yeltsin Rides a Political Roller Coaster," *Report on the U.S.S.R.*, vol. 1, no. 23 (1989), pp. 12-15.

¹⁰The commission was headed by Roy Medvedev, a historian who had been kicked out of the party and was only readmitted in the spring of 1989. For the complicated background of this case, see Julia Wishnevsky, "The Gdlyan-Ivanov Commission Starts Its Work," *Report on the U.S.S.R.*, vol. 1, no. 26 (1989).

Lars T. Lih's publications include *Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914-1921* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, forthcoming).

"Although Soviet military power, both nuclear and nonnuclear, has continued to grow rapidly since 1985, [Soviet President Mikhail] Gorbachev has been steadily laying the groundwork . . . to cut back on military production and reduce the size of the Soviet armed forces over the next decade. . . . The prospect of radical change in Soviet military policy, which seemed inconceivable only a few years ago, can no longer be ruled out."

Soviet Military Policy

BY MARK KRAMER

Research Fellow, Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University

FOR the first two years after Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Soviet Communist party (CPSU) in March, 1985, Soviet military policy changed relatively little. Since mid-1987, however, the Soviet armed forces have increasingly felt the weight of Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost. Although Soviet military power has continued to grow at an impressive rate through the latter half of the 1980's, there is reason to believe that in the 1990's the Soviet Union may be genuinely interested in making substantial cutbacks in its armed forces for the first time since the Nikita Khrushchev era.

As of 1989, the Soviet armed forces consisted of roughly 5.1 million soldiers, not including the 570,000 soldiers belonging to the Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) and the Committee on State Security (KGB).¹ Approximately 65 percent of these soldiers were conscripts. Under the "Law on Compulsory Military Service," virtually all able-bodied 18-year-old males are subject to be drafted for up to two years (or three years in certain units of the Navy) of service. Since early 1989, however, exemptions and deferments of various sorts have been issued with greater frequency, especially for students enrolled in institutes of higher education. By the spring of 1990, the Supreme Soviet is supposed to complete work on a new "Law on Defense" that will more clearly regulate the length of compulsory military duty.

For the last 30 years, the Soviet armed forces have been divided into five main services, namely, the Strategic Missile Forces, the Ground Forces, the Air Defense Forces, the Air Forces and the

Navy. Although the Ground Forces are by far the largest of the five services (in numbers of personnel and weapons), they will be the most heavily affected by the unilateral military reductions announced in December, 1988. Nevertheless, despite the cutbacks, the Ground Forces, with roughly 2 million soldiers on active duty and another 3.5 million in reserve, will still be larger than the entire United States military establishment.

For administrative purposes, Soviet territory is divided into 15 military districts, which correspond roughly to the boundaries of certain oblasts and republics. A sixteenth military district (MD), the Central Asian MD opposite China, was abolished in June, 1989, and its territory and most of its personnel were transferred to the adjacent Turkestan MD.² The Central Asian MD had been under the auspices of the Far Eastern Theater Command, whereas the newly enlarged Turkestan MD will come within the Southern Theater Command. The Central Asian MD had originally been separated from the Turkestan district in mid-1969, just after the series of border clashes with China; no doubt, the recent improvements in Sino-Soviet relations played a key part in the decision to eliminate the Central Asian MD.

Other military districts will also eventually be eliminated or consolidated, according to the chief of the General Staff, Army General Mikhail Moiseev.³ This reduction in the number of MD's, Moiseev claimed, is part of the "radical restructuring" of the whole Soviet military establishment. Not since the postwar adjustments of the late 1940's have the military districts undergone a major realignment.⁴

Although most aspects of the current "radical restructuring" are still hazy at best, sweeping changes have been occurring in the ranks of high-level military personnel. Gorbachev has almost totally replaced the members of the Ministry of Defense Collegium, a body whose membership changed relatively infrequently in the pre-Gorbachev era. The Collegium includes the defense minister (currently

¹International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1988-1989* (London: IISS, Autumn, 1988), p. 33. The MVD and KGB forces were apparently removed from the jurisdiction of the armed forces in early 1989.

²"V Ministerstve oborony SSSR" (In the Soviet Ministry of Defense), *Izvestia*, June 3, 1989, p. 8.

³"Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" (Guarding peace and socialism), *Krasnaya zvezda* (Red Star), February 23, 1989, p. 2.

⁴Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, 3d edition (Boulder: Westview, 1984), p. 188.

Army General Dmitri Yazov), the three first deputy ministers, the chief of the Main Political Directorate, the five service commanders in chief (who also function as deputy ministers) and the six deputy ministers who head various support branches. In April, 1989, Gorbachev appointed an additional deputy minister, Colonel General Yuri Yashin, whose duties have not yet been specified. Of the 17 officers who belonged to the Collegium by the spring of 1989, only two—the Air Forces commander in chief and the head of the Armaments Directorate—had occupied their posts before Gorbachev came to power.

At the levels just below the Ministry of Defense Collegium, changes of personnel have been even more comprehensive. Since 1988, Gorbachev has replaced all four commanders in chief of the Soviet Union's main Theaters of Military Operations (TVD's). He has also appointed new commanders for all 15 Military Districts. In the first four months of 1989 alone, 8 of the 15 Military District commanders were replaced. The four Groups of Soviet Forces deployed in East Europe (including the newly renamed "Western Group of Forces" in East Germany) and the four Soviet Naval Fleets have undergone equally sweeping personnel changes since 1987. None of the highest-ranking officers in any of these units is a holdover from the pre-Gorbachev era. The chiefs of the Chemical Forces, the Signal Forces and the Engineering Forces have also been replaced.

To be sure, a few of the officers who lost their command assignments have not disappeared from the scene altogether. Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, for example, has continued to serve as a military adviser to Gorbachev (in the latter's capacity as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) after relinquishing the post of chief of the General Staff in December, 1988. Aside from these few officials, however, the tendency has been for senior-ranking officers to fade into retirement. This trend reached its culmination in April, 1989, when a dozen older military officers, including figures like Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov and the former defense minister, Marshal Sergei Sokolov, "volunteered" to be dropped from the CPSU Central Committee.

The new commanders and ministerial officials appointed by Gorbachev do not fit into any single mold, although many of them had some connection with the war in Afghanistan. Also, many were stationed in the Far Eastern Military District or Far

Eastern TVD at one time or another. Perhaps surprisingly, most of the highest-level personnel are in their mid-60's; so far, only a relatively small number, including Moiseev and Yashin, represent the younger generation of officers who did not serve in World War II. None of the new officers, not even Defense Minister Yazov, has a rank higher than Army General (the equivalent of a four-star general in the United States); unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev has refrained from promoting officers beyond that level. Consequently, by the end of 1988, the Ministry of Defense Collegium was no longer composed of even a single Marshal of the Soviet Union (MSU)—a striking contrast to the pre-Gorbachev period.

Military personnel were well represented at the Congress of People's Deputies, which met in May and June, 1989. Some 82 officers were either appointed or elected to the Congress, including 48 with ranks of at least general or admiral.⁵ Of the 16 eligible members of the Ministry of Defense Collegium (Yazov, as a minister, was not eligible), 14 served as deputies at the Congress. A few surprises were in hand, however. Army General Boris Snetkov, the commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in East Germany (now called the Western Group of Forces), lost his electoral bid to a young lieutenant colonel who advocated drastic reductions in military spending and an end to the draft. Meanwhile, the former commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Viktor Kulikov, was elected to both the Congress and the new Supreme Soviet, even though he was among those who "retired" from the Central Committee in April, 1989.

The significance of the organizational changes and of the replacements of military personnel is still not clear, but these actions seem geared toward tightening civilian control and downgrading the status of the armed forces. Some sort of "radical restructuring" appears to be under way. Although the campaign has not yet proceeded far enough to permit a firm judgment about its direction or prospects for success, one change that seems likely in the near future—assuming that East-West relations remain stable—is a further reduction in the number of men under arms, beyond the cutbacks announced in December, 1988.

As of mid-1989, according to Army General Aleksei Lizichev, the head of the Main Political Directorate, "nearly 1,400 posts with the rank of general and 11,000 posts with the rank of colonel had been eliminated."⁶ Additional cuts of this magnitude can be expected throughout the armed forces, not least because demographic trends point to a continuing decline in the pool of Russian-speaking and well-educated draftees. In fact, according to Lizichev, "the demographic situation in

⁵For biographical sketches of all 82 of the military representatives at the Congress, see "Doveriem oblechennye" (Confidential portraits), *Kommunist voozruzhennykh sil* (Communist armed forces), no. 19 (May, 1989), pp. 4-29 and no. 12 (June, 1989), p. 3.

⁶*Izvestia*, June 8, 1989, p. 5.

the country is already such that we effectively have no opportunity to be selective about those we call up for military duty."⁷

One other change that may take place in the near future is a restructuring or even a consolidation of the services. There have been several reorganizations of the armed forces since the late 1970's, particularly in the Air Defense Forces, Ground Forces and Air Forces. It seems likely that Gorbachev will continue to seek the optimum structure for the military, even if it requires far-reaching bureaucratic alterations, both within and among the services.

GLASNOST AND THE MILITARY

Gorbachev's encouragement of "new thinking" in foreign policy has led to a wide-ranging public debate about military affairs.⁸ Many issues that were once deemed sacrosanct have come under scrutiny. The thrust of the "new political thinking" so far has been toward a de-emphasis of military force and military solutions to solve conflicts; a less expansive definition of Soviet interests abroad; a less urgent depiction of foreign threats to Soviet security; and a reduced emphasis on ideology in foreign affairs and national defense. The connection between the "new thinking" and actual Soviet policy is not always clear-cut. Much of the ongoing discussion, no doubt, is still intended for propaganda purposes or simply to shift the Soviet Union's image in the world away from the expansionist and menacing image of the 1970's.

Nevertheless, the depth, scope and direction of the conceptual debate suggest that propaganda is not the only objective. Many of the ideas and principles expressed over the past few years depart fundamentally from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. The debate has proceeded too far, and has touched on too many sensitive areas, to be only for external consumption. Gorbachev apparently believes that the conceptual underpinning of Soviet national security policy must be transformed (via the "new political thinking") if he is to ensure that adequate

resources will be available for civilian industrial modernization. Only by moving away from the ingrained Soviet style of "worst-case" threat assessment and force planning can he challenge the highly privileged status that the military has long enjoyed in resource allocation.⁹

To accomplish this task, Gorbachev has solicited the advice of analysts at civilian research institutes, whose work in the past was ignored by policy-making officials. These analysts and other civilians at the Foreign Ministry and the Central Committee's International Department have been given an opportunity to provide a genuine alternative to the military expertise of the General Staff. Although Gorbachev does not intend to displace the professional military as a source of advice, he wants to receive nonmilitary input on a regular basis. Not surprisingly, the growing influence of these civilian analysts has touched off controversy. Virtually every principle espoused by the "new thinkers," especially any hint of a substantial downgrading of the armed forces or of major unilateral Soviet cut-backs and restraints, has encountered at least some resistance and opposition. Although high-ranking military officers have usually voiced this discontent, they almost certainly enjoy the support of like-minded civilian officials.

Some of the public differences aired by military personnel have involved substantive matters, like the definition of "reasonable sufficiency" or the proper balance between defensive and offensive operations. Many civilian writers argue, for example, that the Soviet armed forces should be "structurally incapable" of offensive action; but the dominant view within the military was that expressed by Colonel General Sergei Dikov, deputy chief of the General Staff:

Although our doctrine is in essence defensive, it in no way excludes active offensive operations for carrying out, say, counterattacks, counterstrikes, and counter-offensives, in order to restore a position lost in defense, and in order to rout an enemy that has driven a wedge. There is no contradiction in the fact that we teach our forces offensive operations within the defensive character of our military doctrine. I think that we will continue to teach them the offensive, too, parallel with defense.¹⁰

Continued ambiguity about matters like "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defense" need not be detrimental to Gorbachev. On the contrary, as long as these ideas are sufficiently vague, Gorbachev can invoke them as he sees fit for purposes of resource allocation.

What has been far more troubling for senior military officers is the increasingly hostile tone of the public debate about the armed forces since the

⁷Ibid.

⁸Among the best treatments of this subject are Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," *International Security*, vol. 13, no. 2 (Fall, 1988), pp. 124-163; Edward L. Warner III, "New Thinking and Old Realities in Soviet Defence Policy," *Survival*, vol. 21, no. 1 (January-February, 1989), pp. 13-33; Philip A. Petersen and Notra Trulock III, "A 'New' Soviet Military Doctrine: Origins and Implications," *Strategic Review*, vol. 16, no. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 9-24; and Raymond L. Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 11, no. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 131-158.

⁹See Meyer, op. cit., pp. 127-132.

¹⁰Moscow Television Service, December 5, 1988, transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Soviet Union Daily Report* (cited as FBIS), 88-236, December 8, 1988, p. 80.

Mathias Rust affair of May, 1987.* Although criticism on a selective basis has been welcomed by the military and has prompted long-overdue action (as in the case of recent attempts to curb severe "bullying" in the armed forces), most high-ranking officers seem to believe that healthy criticism has too often degenerated into derision and reflexive antimilitary sentiment. The result, in their view, has been an alarming spread of "pacifism" and "defeatism" and the simultaneous rise of non-Slavic "chauvinists" who regard the Soviet military as an "army of occupation." Yazov has condemned those "who are falsely using glasnost to defame the military," and Lizichev recently expressed "indignation" over "agitators who see only the dark side and who are endeavoring to compromise the Army and its veterans and to undermine the authority of the armed forces among the people."¹¹ An even sterner pronouncement came from Colonel General Makhmut Gareev, a deputy chief of the General Staff:

It is unacceptable when articles published in our press offer judgments about the desirability of our unilateral disarmament. The very necessity of the defense of the Fatherland against imperialist aggression is thereby placed in doubt and hence so is the military profession. Unsound notions of the negative effect of military service on the creative abilities of youth are being disseminated. The true struggle for peace has nothing in common with such one-sided pacifist views. These views have an adverse effect on the performance of defense tasks and merely play into the hands of our ideological enemies.¹²

High-ranking military officials have reacted with particular vehemence to suggestions that the Soviet armed forces should be reconstituted as an all-volunteer force or along ethnic-territorial lines. High-level opposition to an all-volunteer force may run into some thorny problems, however, now that Vladimir Lapygin, the chairman of the Supreme

Soviet's new committee on defense and state security, has publicly endorsed the idea of phasing out conscription.¹³ Indeed, the acrimonious debate in the Supreme Soviet over Yazov's reappointment as defense minister in July, 1989, virtually guarantees that the issue will reemerge, regardless of the objections of senior officials.

Even more disconcerting, from the military's perspective, have been the demands by prominent groups in the three Baltic states for a return to ethnically based units that would serve in their native territory. Some Estonian and Lithuanian groups have called for the withdrawal of Soviet "occupation forces" from Baltic soil and the creation of local armies. Needless to say, these proposals have been denounced by senior military officials. A commentary in the main party newspaper complained that soldiers in the Baltic republics "are now subject to the wildest and most groundless claims for 'historical grievances,' miscalculations and errors."¹⁴ Yazov has repeatedly insisted that "the Army is something that relates to all the people and cannot be composed along ethnic lines," a sentiment unanimously echoed by his colleagues.¹⁵ There is no indication that high-ranking military officials will even consider yielding to the Baltic groups' demands, but there is no indication that the groups themselves will back off. Gorbachev's willingness to allow continued ferment in the Baltic could become a major sore point in civil-military relations.

Expressions of disaffection within the military should, of course, be kept in perspective. Civilian control over the armed forces has been entrenched for so long that it is highly unlikely that the military could pose a meaningful political threat, even if a firm consensus could be reached within the senior officer corps (which is itself unlikely). It is intriguing, nonetheless, that discussion of a possible military coup has surfaced openly in the Soviet Union. In June, 1989, during the formation of the Supreme Soviet's committee on defense and state security, several delegates unsuccessfully argued that the committee should be composed exclusively of civilians "to ensure that there will never be any kind of coup d'état by the military or the KGB."¹⁶ When Yazov was asked point-blank by a Soviet correspondent "whether a military coup is possible in our country," the defense minister responded that in his opinion, "it would be impossible" and that "no one in the Army would act against his own countrymen." But then Yazov ended on a curiously weak

(Continued on page 349).

*The unimpeded (and unauthorized) flight of teenage pilot Mathias Rust from West Germany to Moscow's Red Square on May 29, 1987, resulted in a major embarrassment to the Soviet military and the dismissal of Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov.

¹¹*Krasnaya zvezda* (Red Star), December 25, 1988, p. 2, and *Izvestia*, June 8, 1989, p. 5.

¹²*Sovetskaya voennaya nauka* (Soviet military science), (Moscow: Znanie, 1987), p. 60. Also see Gareev's "Velikii Oktyabr i zashchita rodiny" (Great October and defense of the Fatherland), *Oktyabr*, no. 2 (February 8, 1988), pp. 5-7.

¹³"Glasnost i gosudarstvennaya bezopasnost" (Glasnost and national security), *Izvestia*, June 26, 1989, p. 2.

¹⁴Lieutenant Colonel M. Zakharchuk, "Voprosy k voennym" (Problems of the military), *Pravda*, April 19, 1989, p. 6.

¹⁵"Yazov Discusses Personnel Issues on Phone-In Show," FBIS, 89-087, May 8, 1989, p. 81.

¹⁶Quoted in Bill Keller, "Soviet Legislature Blocks 8 Nominees," *The New York Times*, June 28, 1989.

Mark Kramer is a fellow of Harvard University's Russian Research Center and an adjunct research fellow at Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs.

"The prospect of local elections in 1990 threatens the [Communist] party's control over representative institutions and, possibly, augurs the emergence of nationalist local governments throughout the non-Russian territories. . . . The political appeal of nationalism has helped create forces that challenge the party's monopoly over the authoritative decision-making process in the Soviet Union."

The Soviet Union's Nationalities Question

BY STEVEN L. BURG

Associate Professor of Political Science, Brandeis University

IN a nationally televised message to the country broadcast as part of the regular evening news on July 1, 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union and General Secretary of the Communist party, warned the Soviet people that rising levels of ethnic conflict had put his program of reforms and "the destiny and integrity of our state" in jeopardy. He cautioned that "if we do not recognize the enormous danger of such phenomena, if they spread, we can expect worse times." Gorbachev promised increased government sensitivity and responsiveness "to all legitimate ethnic demands and aspirations," but he warned that he would take "the most decisive measures" against continued unrest. Yet Gorbachev offered neither a definition of what constituted "legitimate" demands, nor a specific program for dealing with the political, economic, cultural, ecological and other demands already raised by organized groups, elected representatives, activists and demonstrators among the nationalities.¹

The speech reflected Gorbachev's political quandary. The economic reforms he has introduced have significantly increased social and economic hardships without thus far producing many material benefits, and this fact has increased the level of dissatisfaction among the Soviet people. At the same time, Gorbachev's political reforms have created ideal conditions for the mobilization of ethnic identity by activists intent on redressing long-held grievances against Moscow, or against their ethnic neighbors.

The campaign for perestroika, or restructuring, has placed all aspects of the Soviet economic and political system on the table for debate. The campaign for glasnost, or openness, has permitted the emergence of free-wheeling discussion, dialogue and polemics in the open media. Almost no topic is considered "taboo." In addition, changes in the elec-

toral system and the composition and competencies of central representative institutions have increased access to participation in the authoritative policy-making process. Under these conditions, activists among the nationalities have publicly addressed emotional ethnic grievances, linking them to broader political and economic demands and generating widespread popular support. As a result, each milestone in the process of reform has been marked by the escalation of activity that undermines the coherence of the Soviet system and Moscow's control over it.

The nineteenth party conference, convened by Gorbachev in June, 1988, to push further reforms, followed 18 months of sometimes violent ethnic unrest. It took place against the background of ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh (the ethnically Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan), growing national assertiveness in the Baltic republics (where independent and strongly nationalist popular political movements were already forming) and mounting evidence of unrest elsewhere.² Yet despite this brewing crisis, the conference adopted a resolution on relations among the nationalities that consisted only of vague calls for devolution of greater autonomy to the republics, improved policy coordination between regional and central institutions, clarification of the economic relations between each republic and the overall economy, the creation of an unspecified central government organ to deal with nationality issues and the adoption of whatever constitutional changes might be required.³

The resolution reflected the continuing belief of Gorbachev and the party leadership that nationality problems could be "solved" through "objective" research and analysis. It called for renewed efforts to instill patriotism and "internationalism" through schooling, propaganda, military service and other instruments of socialization. It contained no recognition, however, of the concrete political and economic conflicts around which ethnic identities were becoming mobilized, or of the need to regulate such

¹*Pravda*, July 2, 1989.

²Lubomyr Hajda, "The Nationalities Problem in the Soviet Union," *Current History* (October, 1988), pp. 325-328, 347, 352.

³*Pravda*, July 5, 1988.

conflicts through interethnic negotiations and substantive concessions, or of the likely effect these would have on the "rules of the game" in Soviet politics.

The conference resolution reiterated Gorbachev's February, 1988, call for the convening of a Central Committee plenum devoted to the nationalities question. But in July, at a plenum devoted to implementation of the decisions of the conference, Gorbachev announced that the nationalities plenum would be delayed until mid-1989. In short, the party leadership was still unprepared to confront the true dimensions of the nationalities problem.

Gorbachev and his allies in the leadership apparently believed that they could co-opt the emerging nationalist movements in the Baltic republics, and perhaps elsewhere, as well. In June, 1988, they permitted the establishment in Estonia of the first officially sanctioned independent mass political organization in the country, the "People's Front"; they appointed Vaino Valas, a new, more flexible republic party leader with personal connections to Gorbachev, and they tolerated the renewed public use of symbols of independent statehood, like the pre-Communist Estonian national flag.

In Lithuania, the rise of independent popular political organizations was at first opposed by the local party leadership. But the appointment of Algirdas Brazauskas as party leader in October, 1988, ushered in a period of official tolerance for the "Movement for Restructuring," known as *Sąjūdis* (Movement), including an attempt by the party leadership to undercut popular support for the movement by adopting more moderate versions of the positions advanced by *Sąjūdis*. In Latvia, too, a new republic party leader, Janis Vargis, was appointed to grant symbolic concessions to local national pride and real concessions to local concerns about the survival of the Latvian language. In addition, Vargis was to conduct relations with a newly established mass organization, the Latvian "Popular Front."

These conciliatory responses failed to blunt the political demands of the independent national movements. Each of the three popular front organizations advanced increasingly radical demands for regional cultural, economic and political autonomy. Nationalist sentiments grew so strong and so quickly that in November, 1988, the Estonian legislature declared Estonia a sovereign state and asserted its right to veto central legislation adopted in Moscow. In February, 1989, *Sąjūdis* publicly declared as its goal the establishment of "an in-

⁴*Chislennost i sostav naseleniya S.S.S.R. po dannym Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1979 goda* (Number and structure of the U.S.S.R. population in the 1979 All-Union population census), (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1984), pp. 7, 71, 102.


dependent and neutral Lithuanian state in a demilitarized zone." The growth of popular support for the Baltic independence movements during the summer and fall of 1988, made clear by the proliferation of their local branches, the growth of their membership and their ability to organize large-scale public demonstrations, inspired activists—and frightened the party leadership—in other republics.

DISSIDENCE IN THE UKRAINE

In the Ukraine, informal groups attempted to establish a Ukrainian popular front organization in the summer of 1988, but they were suppressed by the authorities. Given the relative size and economic importance of the Ukraine and the potential depth of popular grievances against the Soviet system, allowing any nationalist group to organize in the Ukraine may have been seen as too dangerous. According to the 1979 Soviet census, the Ukrainian republic contains 49.8 million people (about 19 percent of the Soviet population). About 36.5 million people (or 73.6 percent of the Ukraine's population) declared Ukrainian nationality. Another 5.9 million Ukrainians live outside the republic. Together, ethnic Ukrainians are the second largest national group in the Soviet Union, accounting for about 16 percent of the Soviet population.

The Baltic republics are far smaller by comparison. Estonia is populated by 1.5 million people (somewhat more than 0.5 percent of the Soviet population), Latvia by 2.5 million (almost 1 percent) and Lithuania by 3.4 million (1.3 percent).⁴ The Ukrainian share of the Soviet economy is correspondingly greater than that of the Baltic republics, as well. The risks associated with any nationalist unrest in the Ukraine are therefore greater than those associated with unrest in the Baltic region.

Ukrainians may also be able to claim more painful grievances against the Soviet system than any other nationality. The Ukraine suffered enormous human and material destruction as the result of the Stalinist collectivization of agriculture, the Nazi German invasion during World War II and the reimposition of Soviet rule. Soviet policies have also restricted the development of the Ukrainian language and culture. Appeals to these past injustices represent a potentially powerful basis for the mobilization of mass support and a powerful threat to Moscow's continued control over the republic. Not surprisingly, therefore, a nationalist dissident movement in the Ukraine in the 1960's was brutally suppressed by Moscow, and Pyotr Shelest, a republic party leader suspected of sympathy for the nationalist cause, was removed from power. His successor, Vladimir Shcherbitsky, re-



Reprinted by permission from *Soviet Society Today*, by Michael Rywkin (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989).

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mains the party's leader and a vigorous opponent of nationalism in the Ukraine today.

By the end of 1988, however, the effort to establish a national movement in the Ukraine had been taken up by members of the official Writers' Union. Despite opposition from the republic party leadership, the Writers' Union formally called for the establishment of a "Ukrainian Popular Movement in Support of Restructuring" and began to gather support from other official groups, informal groups, prominent cultural figures and even dissidents. In January, 1989, the draft program for a "People's Movement for Restructuring in the Ukraine" was completed. It called for political democratization, greater economic autonomy for the republic and official support for the survival of the Ukrainian language and culture, including the establishment of Ukrainian as the official state language of the republic. Despite efforts to accommodate the party, the program and those who prepared it were attacked in the party-controlled media.⁵

Although they have been unable to establish a mass political movement, Ukrainian cultural

figures have established an organization to advance the Ukrainian language and culture. The Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, founded in February, 1989, immediately became a vehicle for the expression of nationalist sentiments and has created additional pressure on the Ukrainian party leadership to drop its resistance.⁶

In late 1988 and early 1989 independent popular political organizations were also established in the Central Asian republics of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The Uzbek group organized a series of large demonstrations in Tashkent in March, April and May, 1989. In early June, ethnic tensions in Uzbekistan produced rioting and violence in which at least 100 people were killed, hundreds more were injured and widespread destruction of property took place. The Uzbek rioters were finally quelled by calling in at least 12,000 soldiers. Rioting on a smaller scale broke out in Kazakhstan later the same month.

Popular political organizations also emerged in Belorussia and Moldavia during this period. In the Caucasus, the Armenian national movement that led the demonstrations over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue continued its activity, and by June, 1989, a Georgian national movement had coalesced, spurred on by the tragic outcome of earlier demonstrations.

In early April, 1989, a wave of strikes and dem-

⁵Bohdan Nahaylo, "Confrontation over Creation of Ukrainian Popular Front," *Report on the U.S.S.R.*, vol. 1, no. 9 (March 3, 1989), pp. 13-20.

⁶Bohdan Nahaylo, "Inaugural Conference on Ukrainian Language Society Turns into Major Political Demonstration," *ibid.*, pp. 20-22.

onstrations swept over Georgia, initiated by activists seeking greater autonomy for the republic and spurred on by fears that the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, a part of the Georgian republic, would be granted separate status in response to demands from the ethnic Abkhazians living there, who constitute only 17.1 percent of the population (Georgians constitute 43.9 percent, the remainder consist mostly of Russians and Armenians).⁷ On April 7, troops were called into Tbilisi to control the demonstrations. In the predawn hours of April 9, however, troops using poison gas, sharpened shovels and sheer brute force attacked peaceful demonstrators in central Tbilisi, killing at least 19 people and escalating a potentially controllable local conflict into a national crisis. Central authorities in Moscow immediately disavowed the violence and the republic party chief was replaced. He was succeeded, however, by the republic's KGB chief, a clear signal that Moscow henceforth intended to control events in the republic more closely.

Events proceeded more peacefully in the Baltic republics in this period, but with no less important implications for the development of Soviet politics. The partial democratization of elections to the new quasi-legislative body, the Congress of People's Deputies, established by Gorbachev as part of his overhaul of central government institutions, created an opportunity for organized political forces like the popular movements in the Baltic republics to win representation in the central policy-making process. In the March, 1989, elections, *Sajudis* won 32 of the 40 seats for which it ran candidates and forced runoff elections in the remaining 8.⁸ Wary of going too far lest it prompt a conservative reaction, *Sajudis* had withdrawn its opposition to Lithuanian party leader Algirdas Brazauskas before the election, allowing him to be elected. The Estonian People's Front and the Latvian Popular Front won equally impressive electoral victories. Although individual opposition candidates won victories all across the Soviet Union in the March, 1989, elections, in some cases defeating prominent party figures, de facto opposition political parties emerged only in the Baltic states.

Electoral victory emboldened not only the political movements themselves, but the incumbents of Baltic republic political institutions as well. In May, 1989, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, or legislature, asserted the right to veto central legislation and called for the independence of the republic, echoing the action taken by its Estonian counterpart in November. The Estonian Supreme Soviet,

meanwhile, was declaring extensive control over the republic's economy. The Latvian Popular Front tends to be somewhat more cautious than the others, because Latvians are only a bare majority in their own republic. They constitute only 53.7 percent of the population, while Estonians constitute 64.7 percent of their republic and Lithuanians 80 percent of theirs.⁹ Nonetheless, in May the Popular Front joined the other Baltic popular movements, issuing a joint call for United Nations support for their quest for independence.

The Georgian events, the violence in Central Asia and the strong representation of the Baltic independent political movements ensured that nationality issues would be a central concern of the new Congress of People's Deputies when it convened in Moscow in May, 1989. The Baltic delegations actively pushed their republics' claims to sovereignty, although they failed to win support for the formal adoption of a republic veto over central legislation. Strong opposition from the Lithuanian delegation, shown by a symbolic "walkout" from the deliberations, won a delay in the formation of a committee empowered to oversee constitutional issues. Armenian and Azerbaijani delegates continued their dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, and Georgian delegates won widespread support for their condemnation of the use of deadly force in Tbilisi. Even the politically more conservative delegations from Ukraine, Belorussia and the Central Asian republics, whose elections had been carefully "rigged" by local party officials, presented a litany of regional economic, social and ecological complaints that took on an ethnic dimension.

In response, Gorbachev could only reiterate his long-standing insistence on subordinating regional interests to the national interest. He offered no new proposals to meet the growing demands for greater regional autonomy, and made no new proposals to ensure the representation of regional interests in the national policy-making process. Instead, he used his control over what one delegate criticized as an "aggressively obedient majority" of the delegates to ensure that the Congress rejected radical proposals, adopted only officially sponsored positions and elected a less independent group of its members to sit in the new national legislature, the Supreme Soviet.¹⁰

After securing his own election as President of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev asked the Congress to delay local and republic elections, originally sched-

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⁷ *Chislennost i sostav naseleniya S.S.S.R.*, p. 124.

⁸ *The New York Times*, March 28, 1989.

⁹ *Chislennost i sostav naseleniya S.S.S.R.*, pp. 126, 128, 136.

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, May 28, 1989.

Steven L. Burg is the author of many articles on Soviet and Yugoslav politics, and of *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983).

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE SOVIET UNION

PERESTROIKA IN PERSPECTIVE: THE DESIGN AND DILEMMAS OF SOVIET REFORM. By Padma Desai. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989. 138 pages, appendixes, notes, references and index, \$14.95.)

Padma Desai's *Perestroika in Perspective: The Designs and Dilemmas of Soviet Reform* is a brief analysis that puts the compelling motivations behind perestroika into a easily readable format. Supplemented by charts, cartoons and photographs, *Perestroika in Perspective* is a Cook's tour of perestroika that highlights the philosophy of the reform movement.

A recurrent theme is perestroika's impact on the industrial, agricultural, service and foreign trade sectors of the Soviet economy. The troubled past and uncertain future of these economic sectors, says Desai, reveal the problems inherent in economic reform. This analysis gives the reader an understanding of the non-economic, as well as the economic, rationale behind the momentous task of changing the Soviet economy.

Desai points out the shortcomings of the current Soviet leadership and the Soviet socioeconomic system. She believes that the inability of many Soviet economists to comprehend the market system, the centrist tendencies of the one-party political system and state ownership of the means of production are serious impediments. Desai also warns that disagreements within the leadership could result in serious and widespread public dissatisfaction, threatening the tenure of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Desai's conclusions about the fate of perestroika and the faults in its design are not new or revolutionary. However, *Perestroika in Perspective* is a useful and intelligent primer on the issues that will determine the fate of the Soviet economy and society in the 1990's. R. Scott Bomboy

LET HISTORY JUDGE: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF STALINISM. By Roy Medvedev. Edited and translated by George Shriver. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. 903 pages, preface to revised edition, glossary and index, \$57.50.)

The release of this extensively revised and expanded edition of Roy Medvedev's classic *Let History Judge* is a good indicator of the extent to which glasnost allows Soviet scholars to "tell it like it is." Medvedev completed the original edition in 1969 while under government surveil-

lance and it was two years before the book appeared in print (in the United States). By 1979, Medvedev's files and notes had been confiscated by Soviet officials; he was prevented from leaving the country and was labeled a "subversive." Today, Roy Medvedev is a representative in the Congress of People's Deputies and is negotiating the publication of *Let History Judge* in the Soviet Union.

The revised and expanded edition, according to Medvedev, is a response to two stimuli. The first is Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's call for academics to fill in "the blank spots" in Soviet history. The second is the persistence of those who want to rehabilitate Stalin's memory. Medvedev says the book's "contents and conclusions" are his answers to those pro-Stalinist elements.

The original edition detailed the causes and consequences of Stalinism, but the expanded edition, by the author's account, is a "new book." All sections have been enlarged and over 100,000 words have been added. Medvedev interviewed hundreds of Stalinist death-camp survivors, and he researched the archives of many victims of the terror. The tone and content of the new edition, therefore, is more critical of the Soviet system than the original edition. *Let History Judge* is a comprehensive indictment of Stalin and his legacy and is an indispensable work for anyone interested in the darker aspects of the Soviet past.

R.S.B.

MOSCOW SPRING. By William and Jane Taubman. (New York: Summit Books, 1989. 301 pages, introduction and epilogue, \$18.95.)

Amherst College professors William and Jane Taubman spent the first six months of 1988 living with their children in a two-room Moscow apartment. The timing of their stay coincided with the "revolution from above" unleashed by perestroika. *Moscow Spring* is a timely, first-hand account of the exciting but painful changes in Soviet life.

Aside from the timing, the Taubmans had two other advantages. Both authors are specialists in Soviet studies (William Taubman, in politics and history, and Jane Taubman, in literature and culture) who have visited the Soviet Union frequently since the start of the Brezhnev era. And both have circles of friends within Soviet society.

Their account, therefore, comes from two perspectives: a generalized observation of the evolu-

tion in Soviet society triggered by perestroika and a personal observation of how perestroika affected the lives of their friends. For example, the importance of certain books and films in the Soviet media is more easily understood when the authors link their symbolic content to the more concrete changes documented in the Western press. In addition, the Taubmans' encounters with the deteriorating Soviet social infrastructure (schools, housing, consumer goods, health care and so on) and with *apparatchiki* help the reader identify with the plight of Soviet citizens in performing the most routine tasks.

Contemporary events in the Soviet Union seem to outpace the ability of experts to analyze their significance. *Moscow Spring* documents an era in Soviet history—the beginning of democratization, glasnost and perestroika—whose importance we may yet not comprehend. R.S.B.

POLITICS, SOCIETY AND NATIONALITY INSIDE GORBACHEV'S RUSSIA. *Edited by Seweryn Bialer.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989. 255 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$28.50, cloth; \$13.95, paper.)

An East-West Forum publication, *Politics, Society and Nationalism Inside Gorbachev's Russia* is an edited collection that assesses several factors underpinning perestroika, including politics, political culture, society and nationality.

In addition to editing this collection, Seweryn Bialer contributes essays on the Boris Yeltsin affair and the changing political system. Peter Hauslohner surveys the roots of reform in the pre-Gorbachev era, while Gail Lapidus discusses the emergence of a civil society in the Soviet Union. Two articles on nationalities issues are included. Alexander Motyl analyses the effects of perestroika on the nationalities problem; and Laurie Salitan writes about the Jewish aspect of the nationalities issue. R.S.B.

SOVIET MILITARY POLICY TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD UNDER GORBACHEV. *By Mark N. Katz.* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989. 103 pages, notes and index, \$33.95, cloth; \$11.95, paper.)

Part of the Center for Strategic and International Studies' *Washington Papers* series, *Soviet Military Policy Toward the Third World under Gorbachev* evaluates recent changes in Soviet third world policy. Gorbachev has modified the military aspects of this policy, writes Katz, to enhance the prospects of his domestic economic policies. The policy's impact on Marxist and non-Marxist regimes, the Soviet military's view of Gorbachev's policy and appropriate United

States responses to Soviet "new thinking" are among the topics discussed. R.S.B.

AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET UNION: COLLUSION AND TRANSFORMATION. *Edited by Milan Hauner and Robert L. Canfield.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989. 219 pages, notes, maps and index, \$38.50.)

With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February, 1989, serious long-term problems face Greater Central Asia (Afghanistan, Iran and the Soviet Muslim republics). *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: Collusion and Transformation* examines past and present Soviet objectives in Greater Central Asia, the increased prominence of Islam in Afghanistan and Iran, and the prospects for change in the Soviet Muslim republics.

The contributors cite five factors that will increase the global profile of Greater Central Asia: the region's economic potential (via natural resources); dramatic demographic shifts; transportation improvements; the new atmosphere in geostrategic relations; and the Sovietization of Afghanistan. In addition, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: Collusion and Transformation* evaluates Islamic ideology (Robert Canfield), the *mujahideen* and the preservation of Afghan culture (Olivier Roy), the economic reasons behind the Afghan invasion (John F. Shroder Jr.), the relationship between Afghanistan and the ethnic region of Turkestan (Victor Mote) and the Soviet geostrategic dilemma (Milan Hauner). R.S.B.

SOVIET STRATEGY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT CONNECTION. *By Daniel R. Kempton.* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989. 261 pages, references and index, \$44.95.)

The evolution of Soviet policy toward national movements in South Africa, Angola and Zimbabwe is the topic of this study. The author reviews the Soviet Union's relationship with the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in Zimbabwe.

Kempton pays special attention to the idiosyncrasies of Soviet strategy toward the ANC, MPLA and ZAPU. He says that the Soviet Union hoped the national movements it supported would adopt the Soviet political model (the vanguard role of the party and the institutionalization of Marxism-Leninism); however, by the late 1980's, this strategy had shifted to an emphasis on settling partisan struggles in international forums. R.S.B.

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WORLD DOCUMENTS

Gorbachev Speaks to the Council of Europe

On July 6, 1989, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev addressed the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France. Excerpts follow, as translated by the Soviet news agency Tass:

It is not enough now to merely state the interdependence and joint destinies of the European states. The idea of European unity should be collectively rethought in the process of the concerted endeavor by all nations, large, medium and small.

Is it realistic to raise this question? I know that many people in the West regard the existence of two social systems as the major difficulty. But the difficulty is rather in the very common conviction, or even a political directive, that overcoming the split of Europe implies the "overcoming of socialism." This is a course toward confrontation, if not worse. There will be no European unity along these lines.

The belonging of European states to different social systems is a reality. Recognition of this historical fact and respect for the sovereign right of every nation to choose freely a social system constitute the major prerequisite for a normal European process.

Social and political orders in one country or another changed in the past and may change in the future. But this change is the exclusive affair of the people of that country and is their choice. Any interference in domestic affairs and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of states—friends, allies or any others—are inadmissible.

Differences among states are not removable. They are, as I have already said on several occasions, even favorable, provided, of course, that the competition between the different types of society is directed at creating better material and spiritual living conditions for all people.

It is time to deposit in the archives the postulates of the cold war period, when Europe was regarded as an arena of confrontation, divided into "spheres of influence," and somebody's "outpost," and as an object of military rivalry, a battlefield. In today's interdependent world, the geopolitical notions born of another era turn out to be just as useless in real politics as the laws of classical mechanics in quantum theory.

Meanwhile, it is on the basis of outdated stereotypes that the Soviet Union is suspected of planning domination and intending to tear the United States away from Europe. There are some who would like to place the U.S.S.R. outside Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, by limiting its expanse "from Brest to Brest." The U.S.S.R., it is alleged, is too big for coexistence. Others would feel ill at ease with

it. The present-day realities and prospects for the foreseeable future are obvious. The U.S.S.R. and the United States constitute a natural part of the European international-political structure. And their participation in its evolution is not only justified, but is also historically determined.

ARMS REDUCTIONS

The philosophy of the "common European home" concept rules out the probability of an armed clash and the very possibility of the use of force or threat of force—alliance against alliance, inside the alliances, wherever. This philosophy suggests that a doctrine of restraint should take the place of the doctrine of deterrence. This is not just a play on words but the logic of European development.

Our goals at the Vienna talks are well known. We consider it quite attainable—and the United States President, too, supports this—to secure a substantially lower level of armaments in Europe in the course of two-three years, with the elimination of all asymmetries and imbalances, of course. And I emphasize—all asymmetries and imbalances. No double standards are admissible here.

We are convinced that it is also time to begin talks on tactical nuclear systems between all countries concerned. The ultimate objective is to fully remove the weapons, which threaten only the Europeans, who by no means intend to wage war on one another. Who then needs them, and what for?

To eliminate nuclear arsenals or to keep them at all costs are the options. Does the strategy of nuclear deterrence strengthen or undermine stability? The positions of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty on these issues look diametrically opposed. However we do not dramatize the divergences.

Why don't the experts of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France, as well as the countries on whose territories nuclear weapons are stationed, discuss these issues in depth? If they arrive at some common evaluations, the problem would become simpler at the political level as well.

If the NATO countries are seen to be ready to enter into negotiations with us on tactical nuclear weapons, we could, upon taking counsel with our allies . . . make further unilateral cuts in our tactical nuclear missiles in Europe without delay. ■

SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM

(Continued from page 332)

The defeat of the proposed tax was taken as a show of support for the new Law on the Cooperatives. The unleashing of private and cooperative initiative was seen as the most effective way to fill the gaps created by the central planners, particularly those resulting from their neglect of consumer goods and services. The cooperative movement, it was reasoned, could move quickly and effectively, as it did during Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920's. That would probably mean an increase in prices as it did in the 1920's, but after a time, especially when others were attracted by the high prices and profits, the number of suppliers would increase and prices would fall.

As anticipated, many enterprises were tempted by profit opportunities. By 1989, over 2 million people joined the process and, as predicted, prices did rise. Unfortunately, after the initial pleasure of seeing new and better goods and services, the public began to notice the higher prices. This is understandable, because many of the new cooperative endeavors were beyond the reach of the average Soviet worker. For example, given the average wage of about 200 rubles a month, there were few who could afford many of the 25-ruble meals offered by most cooperatives. Nor did it help that members of various non-Russian minority groups were the first to set up these cooperatives. All this, along with the fact that a majority of the cooperatives found themselves besieged by racketeers and thugs demanding protection money, created an enormous resentment toward the cooperatives on the part of the general public.

The economist Nikolai Shmelev found it necessary to address what he called a "mob mentality" and to demonstrate that cooperatives were not the cause of the Soviet Union's inflation and other economic problems.⁹ Nonetheless, demands for price controls, higher taxes and, in some cases, the abolition of all cooperatives were heard all over the Soviet Union. Even Gorbachev acknowledged that there was a need for price control and Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov joined him in the call for restrictions on the operations of the cooperatives.¹⁰

By late 1988, new regulations were announced that banned cooperative activity in several areas,

like health care, and soon thereafter, new regulations on prices and operating procedures were instituted.¹¹ Not surprisingly, because of so many restraints, the number of cooperatives did not grow as fast as might otherwise have been the case. This meant, of course, that prices did not drop as rapidly as expected.

The effort to induce the peasants to set up their own cooperatives or family farms was a victim of similar bureaucratic undermining. Those peasants who decided to set off on their own invariably met resistance from local and state party officials. Nor did it help when their former neighbors on state farms began attacking them with cries of "kulak" or, in some cases, with firebombs or knives.

While not so violent, there was also opposition to the legislation authorizing joint ventures that went into effect in 1987. Some of the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Trade who were assigned to promote the creation of joint ventures actually seemed uncomfortable, if not opposed, to the whole idea.¹² Such bureaucratic and ideological opposition has been supplemented by those whose xenophobia leads them to oppose any foreign involvement, especially the foreign exploitation of Soviet labor and raw materials. At the Congress of People's Deputies in June, 1989, there were calls for the amendment of the joint venture law and the expulsion of businesses that have already been established.¹³

IS THE GLASS HALF FULL OR HALF EMPTY?

While noting how difficult it is to generate support for reform measures like the cooperative, joint ventures and family farming, it is necessary to remember that it is a major breakthrough that such institutional changes are even being considered and authorized. Moreover, the cooperative price of products like flowers and even jeans has fallen.¹⁴ However, the overall economic situation seems to have deteriorated. One of the Soviet Union's biggest problems is the budget deficit. This year, according to Prime Minister Ryzhkov, the deficit may be as large as 120 billion rubles. That amounts to 12-13 percent of the Soviet gross national product (GNP), a figure double and perhaps triple the United States budget deficit.

The need to print money to pay the bills of the government of the Soviet Union has sparked the greatest inflation in the Soviet Union since World War II. The increase in the Soviet money supply in 1988 was double that of 1987. This, in turn, in the words of Vasily Seliunin, a Soviet economist, has caused "the collapse of the consumer goods market in front of our eyes in the second half of 1988."¹⁵ As a consequence, basic products now disappear regularly from shop shelves. Thus, in May, 1989,

⁹*Moscow News*, no. 21 (1989), p. 9.

¹⁰FBIS, September 13, 1988, p. 40; January 23, 1989, p. 49; and June 8, 1989, p. 4.

¹¹*Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, no. 1 (1989), p. 4; *Izvestia*, February 24, 1989, p. 2; *Moscow News*, March 5, 1989, p. 4.

¹²*Moscow News*, no. 11 (1987), p. 7.

¹³*Izvestia*, June 2, 1989, p. 9.

¹⁴*Moscow News*, no. 26 (1989), p. 14.

¹⁵*Sotsialisticheskaya industriya*, April 6, 1989, p. 1.

there were shortages of tea, cheese, matches, sausage, butter, salt, soap and even sugar.

Nor were Soviet economists particularly enthusiastic about the future. At a conference after the Congress of People's Deputies, Vladimir Tikhonov, one of Gorbachev's chief advisers on agriculture, warned that unless there were a marked improvement in Soviet agriculture, in a year's time the Soviet people would face hunger.¹⁶ At the same time, Leonid Abalkin, the former director of the Institute of Economics and now Deputy Prime Minister, said that unless there were an economic turnaround within 18 months, the Soviet Union was likely to face a reaction from the right.¹⁷ He was joined by others, including V.A. Vlasov, who predicted "the rise of strong-arm methods" by "an alliance . . . between members of the military and reactionaries."¹⁸

Given his political adroitness and his determination to succeed, Gorbachev may yet manage to revamp and revitalize the Soviet economic system. It is critical that he succeed, for it is in the economic reform field that Gorbachev will ultimately be judged. While most of the Soviet people share at least vicariously when Gorbachev is accorded a warm reception in his international visits, pomp and popularity overseas are not enough. Such visits tend to obscure the seriousness of the continually worsening economic situation at home. And the fact is that Gorbachev is directly responsible for some of that deterioration. Regardless of his popularity outside the country, if Gorbachev does not soon find a solution to these crisis, he may not be around to continue his efforts. ■

¹⁶FBIS, June 20, 1989, p. 97.

¹⁷*Boston Globe*, June 17, 1989, p. 2.

¹⁸FBIS, June 20, 1989, p. 61.

SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

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note: "Besides, the military-administrative division of the country is such that it would make a coup very difficult to carry out."¹⁷

It would be wrong to make too much of these scattered comments about a military takeover. No

¹⁷Nataliya Gevorkyan, "Voenniy perevorot nevozmozhn" (Military revolution is impossible), *Moskovskie novosti* (Moscow News), no. 24 (June 11, 1989), p. 2.

¹⁸United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and United States Defense Intelligence Agency, *The Soviet Economy in 1988: Gorbachev Changes Course*, April 14, 1989, p. 15.

¹⁹"Sluzhit interesam naroda" (To work in the interests of the people), *Izvestia*, June 8, 1989, p. 3.

²⁰See Army General M. Moiseev, "Oboronnii byudzhet SSSR" (Soviet defense budget), *Pravda*, June 11, 1989, p. 5.

²¹A. Isaev, "Reforma i oboronnnye otrasli" (Reform and branches of the military), *Kommunist*, no. 5 (March, 1989), pp. 24-30.

one in the West can be sure why concerns of this sort have been expressed in public. Perhaps the comments are genuinely indicative of broader unease within the military that could grow once prospective budget cuts begin to take their toll. Alternatively, they may simply reflect widespread public discontent with the forceful use of troops in Tbilisi in April, 1989, a sentiment that was evidenced at the Congress of People's Deputies. Whatever the explanation, the discussion of a military coup could ultimately benefit Gorbachev by affording a pretext for the assertion of even stricter civilian control.

SPENDING, PRODUCTION AND CUTBACKS

During Gorbachev's first four years in office, Soviet military spending grew by roughly 3 percent a year after inflation, according to United States intelligence estimates.¹⁸ That annual rate of growth is significantly higher than the rate in the nine years before Gorbachev came to power. The Soviet Prime Minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov, acknowledged that military expenditures increased rapidly between 1985 and 1988 and were originally supposed to continue to rise through 1990, but the figures that he and other Soviet officials have now provided for the Soviet military budget raise more questions than they answer.¹⁹

At the Congress of People's Deputies, Gorbachev first reported a total of 77.3 billion rubles (R) for Soviet military spending in 1989. Ryzhkov subsequently offered a breakdown of that total: procurement (R32.6 billion), research and development (R15.3 billion), operations and maintenance (R20.2 billion), pensions (R2.3 billion), military construction (R4.6 billion) and other expenses (R2.3 billion). A separate figure that Ryzhkov provided for military space programs, R3.9 billion, brought the total official military budget to R81.2 billion. Other comments about the defense budget have since appeared in the Soviet press.²⁰

The problem with Soviet statistics, however, is that no one knows what they really mean. Compared with Western estimates, which show military spending to be at least 16-18 percent of the Soviet gross national product (GNP), the figures provided by Ryzhkov seem far too low, perhaps by a factor of two or three. Moreover, even if the official Soviet statistics were deemed credible, there would still be an inherent difficulty in gauging their significance. Without a meaningful price system in the Soviet Union, the official cost of weapons and other military items bears little or no relation to actual costs. A recent article in the main party journal confirmed that official prices for military goods are held artificially low, thus greatly understating the actual military budget.²¹ Until meaningful prices exist in

the Soviet Union, including the defense sector, all official figures for Soviet military spending will be of very limited merit.

More instructive are the recent trends in Soviet weapons production. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, the annual quantity of items produced by Soviet military factories dipped well below the production rates of the early to mid-1970's. That trend was due to the greater sophistication (and therefore expense) of the latest Soviet weapons and normal cycles in production runs; but it was also apparently due to policy decisions connected with the broader slowdown of the Soviet economy.²² Since 1985, however, the rate of Soviet military production has, in virtually all cases, stabilized or resumed an upward climb. What is more, the production of large quantities of military goods has been accompanied by major improvements in quality. For example, the latest Soviet fighters, the MiG-29 and the Su-27, are markedly superior to their predecessors. The same applies to the latest Soviet Akula- and Sierra-class submarines and to the Soviet Union's two new mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), the SS-24 and SS-25. Most other types of weapons have undergone similar improvements.

This pattern in Soviet military production may seem curious at a time when Gorbachev has been prodding the country's defense industries to focus more on civilian goods. At present, according to Soviet military officials, 40 percent of the output from military factories is civilian-related; by 1995, Gorbachev wants to boost that proportion to 60 percent. Such a policy, if unaccompanied by sweeping market-oriented reforms, may prove to be of only negligible long-term benefit to the Soviet economy; but, leaving aside the merits of the approach, Gorbachev will have to be willing to pare back military production in order to achieve his goals. Current Soviet military output still owes a lot to the huge investments and sunk costs made during the Brezhnev years. By the mid-1990's, Gorbachev will no longer have that cushion. Thus, trade-offs and hard choices loom ahead, starting as early as 1991, when the thirteenth five year plan begins.

Although it is impossible to predict whether Gorbachev will make all the tough choices needed, he has certainly demonstrated over the past few years that he will proceed further than other Soviet leaders would have contemplated. A shift to significantly less military production in the future is therefore no longer implausible. Indeed, the unilateral

force reductions that Gorbachev announced in his speech before the United Nations on December 7, 1988, may augur the start of such a process. The reductions, which by mid-1989 were already under way, affect units stationed both within the Soviet Union and on East European territory, including some assault formations and river-crossing equipment.

Overall, by 1991 the Soviet Union is supposed to reduce its troop strength by 500,000, its tanks by 10,000, its combat aircraft by 800 and its artillery pieces by 8,500. Of these cuts, 5,300 of the tanks and 50,000 of the soldiers (plus other components of six tank divisions) are to be removed from East Europe. In addition, all six East European members of the Warsaw Pact have announced cutbacks of their own, including some that go further, proportionately, than the Soviet reductions.

The precise impact of these cuts on the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)-Warsaw Pact military balance is difficult to gauge. Quantitatively, the reductions will still leave the Soviet Union and its allies with large advantages in most categories of weapons. The number of Warsaw Pact tanks, for example, will drop from 69,000 to 59,000, but the lower total will still be more than 2.5 times as many tanks as NATO possesses. Moreover, most of what the Eastern bloc will lose in quantity under the announced cuts will be offset by improvements in quality. The 3,500 modern tanks that the Soviet Union produced in 1988 are far superior to the T-54 and T-55 tanks that will be eliminated. In fact, the reductions may leave the Warsaw Pact with a more effective combat posture than it has at present. Current Soviet force-to-space ratios are so high along key parts of the 750-kilometer divide in Europe that NATO might be able to use "emerging technology" weapons to destroy large clusters of Soviet forces. Once the projected reductions are carried out, Warsaw Pact units will no longer be so easy to target, yet they will still have immense firepower at their disposal.

If the unilateral reductions are not particularly onerous for the Warsaw Pact in strictly military terms, they are unquestionably important in their symbolic effect. Before Gorbachev made his speech, high-ranking military officers had been unanimous in rejecting the idea of unilateral cuts. In mid-1988, for example, Army General Vitali Shabanov, a long-time deputy defense minister, declared "most emphatically" that reductions of forces in Europe "cannot be unilateral."²³ Likewise, the commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces, Army General Ivan Tretyak, warned that the Soviet Union's unilateral reductions in the late 1950's had been a "rash step" that "dealt a terrible blow to our defense capacity." Any proposals for such measures in the

²²Richard F. Kaufman, "Causes of the Slowdown in Soviet Defense," *Soviet Economy*, vol. 1, no. 1 (January-March, 1985), pp. 9-31.

²³Interview with Shabanov in R. Jeffrey Smith, "Arms Budget Cut, Soviet Says," *The Washington Post*, July 27, 1988.

future, Tretyak emphasized, must be "examined a thousand times over."²⁴

After Gorbachev's speech, Soviet officials repeatedly insisted that the proposed unilateral cuts had met with the approval of the military. The reductions, Yazov and others noted, had indeed "been examined a thousand times over."²⁵ No doubt, these claims were accurate for the most part, given the limited military significance of the cutbacks. Certainly, no high-ranking officers resigned in protest or expressed even a hint of public opposition.²⁶

Nevertheless, there was little question that the unilateral measures were a slap in the face for the military. The important thing was not the immediate effect of the cuts but where they might lead. The announcement of unilateral reductions was, in that sense, an assertion by Gorbachev of his control over the country's defense agenda. Whether in fact he will continue to pursue unilateral gestures of this sort is, of course, another matter. On the one hand, Gorbachev does have substantial leeway to make further cuts before significantly hampering Soviet military capabilities. Moreover, a shift from the current army-division-regiment structure of the Soviet armed forces to a unified corps-brigade system, as has already taken place in Hungary, would permit a reduction of thousands of personnel without any decrease in combat readiness. On the other hand, Gorbachev is aware of the strong sentiment within the military that "the socialist countries should not make any further unilateral reductions . . . until they are really convinced of NATO's readiness to take similar steps."²⁷ The need for unilateral initiatives, in any case, is steadily declining now that budgetary pressures have induced both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to move closer to a conventional arms control agreement.

²⁴"Nadezhnaya oborona—prezhde vsego" (Dependable defense, above all), *Moskovskie novosti* (Moscow News), no. 8 (February 21, 1988), p. 12.

²⁵See, for example, the interview with Moiseev in *Argumenty i fakty* (Arguments and facts), no. 15 (April 15–21, 1989), p. 2, and the interview with Akhromeev in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Soviet Russia), January 14, 1989, p. 3.

²⁶Contrary to initial speculation in the West, it is clear that Akhromeev's resignation as chief of the General Staff in December, 1988, was not intended as a protest. He has remained a prominent adviser to Gorbachev.

²⁷Interview with Army General Pyotr Lushev, in *Narodna armiya* (People's Army) (Sofia), April 5, 1989, p. 4.

²⁸United States Department of Defense, *1989 Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative*, March 13, 1989, p. A-5.

²⁹United States CIA, *A Comparison of the U.S. and Soviet Industrial Bases*, SOV 89-10020, May, 1989, pp. 10–12.

³⁰For Ogarkov's views, see *Kommunist*, no. 7 (May, 1978), pp. 115–119; *Kommunist*, no. 10 (July, 1981), p. 86; *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* (Always be ready to defend the Fatherland), (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982), pp. 29–33; and *Istoriya uchit bditelnosti* (History teaches vigilance), (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), pp. 47–48.

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY

One of the main impulses behind Gorbachev's economic revitalization program has been his perception of a widening high-technology gap between East and West. Although Soviet scientists have been able to keep abreast of (or even surpass) their Western counterparts in certain fields, like metallurgy and rocket engineering, the Soviet Union is now generally at least 5 to 10 years behind the West in computing and microelectronics, the two areas of arguably the greatest importance for modern weaponry.²⁸ Not only is this a serious problem in its own right, it has a spillover effect on the whole Soviet industrial base. Even if Soviet managers had sufficient incentive to adopt innovative production technologies (which in many cases they still do not), the dearth of flexible manufacturing systems and computer-operated machine tools in the Soviet Union would leave many factories with little choice but to retain the same sort of obsolescent equipment they have been using for decades.²⁹ Consequently, Gorbachev's sweeping program of industrial modernization has been contingent, from the start, on rapid progress in computing and microelectronics.

Not surprisingly, Gorbachev's concerns about the Soviet Union's lagging technological capabilities are widely shared by senior military officers. Indeed, this anxiety long predates Gorbachev. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff in the late 1970's and early 1980's, consistently advocated higher military expenditures to upgrade the quality of Soviet weapons technology.³⁰ Ogarkov's warnings took on a new urgency after the June, 1982, air battle over Lebanon, in which the Israelis shot down more than 80 Soviet-made planes while losing none of their own. Although the outcome of the battle was probably caused at least as much by the Israelis' superior training, tactics and morale as by the quality of their American-made aircraft, there was a widespread impression afterward—whether justified or not—that the deficiencies of Soviet equipment had been at least partly responsible for the humiliating defeat Syria suffered in the air battles with Israel.

Other developments in the mid-1980's also lent credence to Ogarkov's calls for an acceleration of Soviet technological progress. The United States launching of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March, 1983, was the most conspicuous of these developments, but equally important from the Soviet standpoint were NATO's initial deployments of "emerging technology" weapons, including advanced reconnaissance platforms, precision-guided submunitions and fuel-air-explosive warheads. These futuristic weapons, Ogarkov argued, would give NATO precisely what it needed to carry

out long-range counterattacks against large groups of Soviet and East European forces, thus undermining the Warsaw Pact's strategy of sustained, massed attacks. Although Ogarkov was demoted in September, 1984, for his outspoken demeanor, his warnings about the necessity of technological improvements continued to be stressed by other high-level military officials.

To be sure, the magnitude of the problem confronting the Soviet military should not be overstated. Compared with most civilian industries, the defense sector is in reasonably good shape. Enormous investments in the 1970's led to the retooling and comprehensive modernization of most Soviet defense factories; as a result, the level of manufacturing technology in the defense sector is now well above the level in the civilian sector.³¹ Nevertheless, the defense industries are not as technologically advanced as they should be, especially in their use of computers and microelectronics. Nor can the military industries operate in isolation from the civilian sector, on which they depend for support equipment, machinery and intermediate products. Hence the "technological backwardness" of Soviet civilian industry, as Gorbachev has described it, impairs the quality of military production.³²

For that reason, the Soviet armed forces have a crucial stake in the success of Gorbachev's restructuring of the Soviet economy (*perestroika*). No other group in Soviet society will benefit more from a sound economic and technological base. Still, it would be simplistic to suggest, as many Western observers have suggested, that Soviet military commanders would welcome sharp cuts in the defense budget for several years or more if that were needed to revitalize the economy. Large, bureaucratic organizations like the Soviet military are rarely as forward-looking as this scenario implies, especially when they have no guarantee that their sacrifices will pay off in the end. Sweeping cuts in military production may yet occur, but it is unlikely that they will be eagerly accepted by the senior officer corps. Commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, recently warned,

³¹On these points, see Richard F. Kaufman, "Industrial Modernization and Defense in the Soviet Union," in Reiner Weichardt, ed., *The Soviet Economy: A New Course?* NATO Colloquium, April 1-3, 1987 (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1988), pp. 247-261.

³²*Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlya nashei strany i dlya usugo mira* (Perestroika and new thinking for our country and for total peace), (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988), p. 91.

³³*Otvetsvennost za perestroiku* (Responsibility for perestroika), *Krasnaya zvezda* (Red Star), June 9, 1989, p. 2.

³⁴Army General Dmitri Sukhorukov, Moscow Television Service, April 15, 1989, transcribed in FBIS, 89-074, April 19, 1989, p. 117.

³⁵*K novoi modeli bezopasnosti* (Toward a new model of security), *Krasnaya zvezda* (Red Star), June 20, 1989, p. 1.

The reduction in appropriations for defense must be within reasonable limits. . . . It is unrealistic to use the Armed Forces as a foil for all the country's troubles, as some comrades would like.³³

Whatever their misgivings, most Soviet officers recognize that substantial cutbacks in military production may be in the offing. From their perspective, improvements in technology will be all the more important. In the past, the Soviet Union could always rely on the expansion of its forces to produce greater military power, but now, if military production is to be curtailed, the armed forces will have to "compensate for these reductions with qualitative parameters."³⁴ The objective, according to Yazov, is to bolster the "quality of the armed forces" so dramatically as to "permit reductions of military expenditures without any detriment to the country's defense capacity."³⁵ This notion of substituting quality for quantity may be far too optimistic, but it points to a likely trend in future Soviet military planning.

To the extent that the Soviet Union can actually achieve greater technological sophistication at an acceptable cost, force reductions could even prove beneficial. In an age of highly destructive "conventional" weaponry, as noted earlier, lower force-to-space ratios will help ensure the survival of Soviet units. Moreover, if Soviet force reductions are part of a NATO-Warsaw Pact arms control agreement, the "threat" that Soviet forces must counter will be substantially diminished. To meet Yazov's criteria, however, Gorbachev will have to reorient the Soviet weapons industry toward much greater technological innovation and shorter production runs. Although some movement in that direction has been evident since the late 1970's, serious problems could arise for Gorbachev if the adoption of "emerging technologies" does not proceed smoothly.

After some 25 years of continual expansion, the Soviet armed forces face severe resource constraints in the 1990's. Although Soviet military power, both nuclear and nonnuclear, has continued to grow rapidly since 1985, Gorbachev has been steadily laying the groundwork—through organizational changes, conceptual innovations and the pursuit of arms control—to cut back on military production and reduce the size of the Soviet armed forces over the next decade. Whether such efforts will be fruitful is still unclear. Even if progress in arms control is swift, the domestic pressures for continued priority in resource allocation to the military will remain strong. As a 1986 study observed:

Resources devoted to the military [in the Soviet Union] are shielded from diversion to other claimants by the mechanics of the planning system. . . . The same mechanisms that protect military interests prob-

ably—in the short run—also make it difficult to change the level of military output, at least in peacetime. . . . The momentum engendered by the planning system makes it necessary for top leaders to intervene when entirely new programs or directions are sought.³⁶

If Gorbachev is indeed contemplating “entirely new directions” for the Soviet armed forces, he will have “to intervene” in military affairs far more than he already has. The toughest decisions still lie ahead. Thus, it would be premature to assume that Gorbachev, or any Soviet leader, can overcome all the formidable obstacles to change. Too much of what has occurred in the military sphere could still be—indeed is likely to be—subject to reversal or erosion, even if Gorbachev remains in office. Nevertheless, it would be equally premature to suggest that the current upheaval in Soviet national security affairs is doomed to be an evanescent phenomenon, with no lasting effect on the Soviet armed forces. The prospect of radical change in Soviet military policy, which seemed inconceivable only a few years ago, can no longer be ruled out. ■

³⁶United States Central Intelligence Agency, *The Soviet Weapons Industry*, DI-86-10016, September, 1986, pp. 14–15.

SOVIET POLITICS

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It would be inaccurate to call Ligachev an opponent of economic reform, although in his speeches he seems to emphasize the unacceptability of a market system. What upsets Ligachev most about perestroika in its present version is the muckraking about the Soviet past and the Yeltsin-style attack on the party apparatus. Ligachev's natural constituency is the worried party elite; members of this group want economic reform without losing their privileged position. But Ligachev is also reaching out to forces outside the party, particularly to Russian nationalists. These nationalists have no particular love for the Communist party, but they are worried about what they see as a decline in morality caused by perestroika and glasnost, as shown in everything from beauty contests to rising crime rates.

The conflict between Ligachev and Yeltsin represents something unseen since the 1920's: open, programmatic conflict within the party. Even in the 1920's, the warring factions did not take their conflict outside the party and look for social support. Andrei Sakharov, however, is a figure completely without precedent in Soviet politics: a political leader who is not a party member and whose political base comes from society. Sakharov is a world-famous scientist who rejected his privileged position to become a courageous fighter for human rights. After protesting the war in Afghanistan, he was held incommunicado for several years in a pro-

vincial town. When Gorbachev finally released him from this internal exile, Sakharov continued to say exactly what he thought. He almost did not make it to the Congress of People's Deputies, since the Academy of Sciences refused to nominate him as one of their candidates. Although Sakharov could probably have been elected from a territorial election district, he insisted that he would accept a nomination only from the Academy. He was vindicated when most of the Academy's official slate was rejected and new nominees had to be found.

Sakharov's program represents the radical reformist outlook that is most congenial to the West. It is a mistake to think that the reformers are capitalists in disguise, as many Soviet conservatives charge. It is not capitalism the radical reformers want, but a normal modern society: parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, open borders, disciplined and self-reliant executives and workers in an affluent society. They are also deeply committed to a full examination of the Soviet past and its many dark pages. Sakharov is the chairman of the Memorial Society that has been set up to build a monument to Stalin's victims.

None of these currents of social opinion are blindly loyal to Gorbachev. Yet this paradoxically might provide him with strength, because he can play these factions against each other: each of them fears the others more than they distrust him. Gorbachev spent the year 1989 strengthening his power base both in the party and in the state. Each time it appeared that Gorbachev might be running into trouble with his fellow oligarchs, he beat them to the punch and obtained the resignations of most (not all) of the holdovers from the Brezhnev past. His election as head of state gives him even more security. Even though his personal popularity may have declined as the economic situation has deteriorated, Gorbachev continues to dominate the political scene through his energy, his skill and his commitment to his own vision of reform.

LOOKING AHEAD

Gorbachev's vision includes both ends and means. He wants to effect radical changes without rejecting the foundations of the system; his aim is a rejection of the Stalinist heritage in favor of the original socialist ideal of a highly productive, just society. Along the way to this radical renewal, he is struggling to keep the Soviet Union from falling apart by preaching compromise, discipline, unity and anything that will prevent centrifugal forces from flying out of control.

Any democratic system would find it hard to survive in an environment of growing economic despair. It is many times more difficult for a fledgling democracy to confront the pent-up pressures of

decades of neglect. A parable of the times is a mass grave in Siberia near the river Ob where the local police shot victims of Stalinist repression. Although the bodies were buried, the river ate away at the bank until in 1979 the town faced corpses floating in the river. The official response at that time was to get rid of the corpses and pretend nothing had happened. Only now is an effort being made to commemorate the victims and face up to the Stalinist legacy.¹¹

Like the horrifying mass graves, the bankruptcy of the political and economic system established during the Stalin years can no longer be evaded. The coming months will begin to show whether Soviet society has the resources to renew itself. Will the Congress of People's Deputies and the new Supreme Soviet be able to transform themselves into a genuine sovereign legislature? Will the political leadership succeed in carrying out the economic reforms that will free economic initiative from the deadening hand of central command? And even if the reforms are implemented, will they be able to mitigate the increasingly bitter conflicts tearing Soviet society apart?

In the early years of perestroika, it was euphemistically said that Soviet society was in a "pre-crisis" condition. Today, no one denies that the country faces a deep and genuine crisis. But a crisis of what? Of perestroika, as many Soviet conservatives believe? Of socialism, as many in the West believe? Or of the Stalinist economic and social system in its final death throes, as the reformers fervently hope?¹² All that can be said is that the extraordinary drama of Soviet reform is not over; the brave plunge into the unknown has not yet reached its destination. ■

¹¹*Pravda*, May 11, 1989. Mass graves were also discovered in Belorussia and the Ukraine.

¹²Fedor Burlatski, "Pervyi, no vazhnyi shag" (The first, but important step), *Literaturnaya gazeta*, June 14, 1989, p. 1.

THIRD WORLD POLICY

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Havana, Luanda and Pretoria.¹⁵

Ultimately, the United States mediation effort produced an agreement to grant Namibia independence in exchange for a complete Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Despite earlier Soviet reluctance to back the negotiations, Moscow participated as an observer in the last round and came out formally in favor of both the process and the results.

¹⁵For details of the negotiations, see Charles W. Freeman Jr., "The Angola/Namibia Accords," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 3 (1989).

¹⁶*The New York Times*, June 14, 1989.

¹⁷Kurt Campbell, *Soviet Policy Toward South Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 45, 95-126.

Indeed, Anatoly Adamishin, a deputy foreign minister, spoke at the occasion of the formal signing at the United Nations. Most recently, the Marxist regime and Unita agreed to a cease-fire. Although the final shape of the Angolan government is yet to be decided, that the Soviets have supported mediation efforts even when the negotiations were not carried out under their auspices indicates a significant shift in Soviet policy.

Soviet policy in Mozambique, in contrast, illustrates that Moscow is concerned about the fate of its client, but that the relationship is not nearly so important to the Soviet Union nor is the Soviet Union willing to provide the same kind of support. Unlike Angola, Mozambique is destitute, and the political situation is more fragile. Maputo has tread carefully, seeking aid from and trade with the West, particularly the United States, while maintaining its ties with Moscow. Although the Kremlin would be concerned if the current leadership in Mozambique significantly reoriented its foreign policy, Gorbachev does not seem interested in underwriting another long drawn-out counterinsurgency.

Ethiopia is a significant geostrategic asset to the Soviet Union. Extensive facilities on Dahlak Island rewarded Moscow's (and Havana's) long-term commitment to Addis. Under pressure from the Brezhnev Kremlin, Ethiopia created a full-fledged Communist party and, finally, after years of Moscow's urging, declared itself a people's republic. Yet, despite the advantages of the relationship, the Soviet Union is apparently more open about Ethiopia's drawbacks. Press dispatches have highlighted problems of bureaucratization and Ethiopia's inability to feed itself.

The recent abortive military coup against President Mengistu Haile Mariam underscored the regime's vulnerability and the long-term problems it faces. Moscow has tired of the civil wars raging in Eritrea and Tigre and has urged the Mengistu regime to reach a political solution. In fact, in the aftermath of the coup attempt, Mengistu offered to negotiate with the separatists. The Tigrean leadership accepted, but thus far the Eritreans have not.¹⁶ A calmer, more stable and more efficient Ethiopia that retained its links with Moscow would certainly be an even greater asset to the Soviet Union.

One cannot overlook South Africa in this discussion. Moscow maintains consistent relations with the ANC, and it has used every opportunity to vilify the Pretoria government and its policy of apartheid. Simultaneously, however, the Kremlin has held talks with Zulu Chief Buthelezi and has conducted shadowy deals in diamonds and metals with South Africa.¹⁷ The Soviet Union is thus in contact with several forces within the country and seems to be positioning itself to take advantage of the evolving

situation. It is unclear whether Moscow, with its new interest in worldwide trade, would like to see a period of prolonged instability in South Africa. A smooth transitional period, or a significant moderation of apartheid—however unlikely a prospect—might be more to the Kremlin's taste.

LATIN AMERICA

In Latin America, Soviet policy has followed similar patterns. Even before Brezhnev's death in 1982, the Soviet Union was trying to expand its relations with Central and South America. While Moscow benefited from the victories of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the New Jewel Movement in Grenada, it also managed, between the mid-1960's and 1979, to more than double the number of countries with which it has diplomatic relations. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union has intensified its quest for regularized diplomatic and trade relations with the region.

Since 1985, several high-ranking Soviet officials have toured Latin America. Shevardnadze visited Mexico and Cuba in 1986 and in the same year Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín and Uruguayan Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias traveled to the Soviet Union. In 1987, then-Politburo member Boris Yeltsin led a delegation to Nicaragua, and Shevardnadze returned to the region, visiting Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Cuba. Brazilian President José Sarney traveled to Moscow in October, 1988. Throughout, the Soviet Union tried to enhance its long-term ties with Mexico and to develop its trade relations with the newly industrializing states of the region.

This emphasis on diplomacy is coupled, however, with more traditional types of Soviet relations with the "radicals" and with local Communist parties. Vadim Zagladin, of the party's International Department, visited Nicaragua in 1987 and was followed by other officials. In early 1988, Nicaraguan party operative Bayardo Acre met with Anatoly Dobrynin and Karen Brutents (both officials of the International Department) to sign a cooperative agreement between the CPSU (Communist party of the Soviet Union) and the Sandinista Front.¹⁸ Moscow has continued to aid Cuba and Nicaragua militarily. Both receive more than 80 percent of their arms from the Soviet Union, totaling close to \$2 billion a year.¹⁹

Finally, Gorbachev himself traveled to Havana

¹⁸Jan S. Adams, "Change and Continuity in Soviet Central American Policy," *Problems of Communism*, March-June, 1989, p. 117.

¹⁹See the discussion of the value of Soviet arms transfers to Central America in *ibid*.

²⁰*The New York Times*, May 17, 1989.

²¹See for example, *Izvestia*, June 6, 1989, p. 3, in FBIS, 89-108, June 7, 1989, p. 7.

in April, 1989, and met with Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The trip, postponed because of the Armenian earthquake, illustrated the strengths and the tensions of Soviet-Cuban ties. Currently, both are seeking to normalize relations with the rest of Central and South America and both have agreed to the disengagement from Angola. At the same time, differences remain. On more than one occasion Castro has rejected any suggestions that Cuba undertake perestroika. Such a move would please Moscow, which would benefit economically if it could cut subsidies estimated at close to \$5 billion a year. Castro has also reminded Gorbachev that détente with the United States should not proceed at the expense of Moscow's long-term allies in the third world. Gorbachev's displeasure at some of Castro's statements may be seen in the fact that the Soviet Union did not forgive Cuba's debt. Thus, this trip to a full-fledged member of the Communist camp was basically harmonious, although sharp ideological differences remain between Moscow and Havana.

ASIA

In Asia, major strides have been made in normalizing Soviet relations with a long list of nations. In his Vladivostok speech of July, 1986, Gorbachev offered to reopen cordial relations with China by satisfying Beijing's three demands: a withdrawal from Afghanistan, the removal of Soviet forces from Mongolia, and an end to Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. In 1989, Moscow completed the Afghan withdrawal, an agreement had been negotiated between Vietnam and Cambodia, and there had been at least a token Soviet withdrawal from Mongolia. Thus the stage was set for Gorbachev's historic trip to Beijing. The dramatic reconciliation of the two Communist giants included not only the normalization of formal diplomatic relations but also the reinstitution of party-to-party ties severed in 1961. The coincidence of Gorbachev's visit and the massive student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square embarrassed the Chinese, especially when Gorbachev urged the Chinese Communist leadership to listen to the young.²⁰ Nonetheless, Moscow responded to the suppression of the students in a rather even-handed way. *Izvestia* did report the numbers killed and injured, and although the Soviet leadership lamented the use of force, it stopped short of condemning the massacre.²¹ In fact, it implicitly criticized other major powers for interfering in Chinese affairs.

Another major focus of the Gorbachev era has been India. New Delhi has been an ally of long standing, with a 1971 friendship and cooperation treaty. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was

among the first heads of state to visit the newly appointed General Secretary and Gorbachev has traveled to India twice, in 1986 and 1988. Efforts to increase Soviet-Indian trade have been made, and Moscow also signed an agreement in 1986 for Indian manufacture of the MiG-29. Despite some strains over trade and over Indian diversification of its arms suppliers, Gorbachev has made it clear that ties with other third world states should be modeled after the Soviet-Indian relationship.²²

The rest of Asia has witnessed an extraordinary diplomatic offensive. Moscow has tried to establish ties to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with exchanges of delegations between the Soviet Union and Malaysia and Thailand. The focus of these meetings has been trade, and they have netted several commercial protocols. Significantly, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze recently traveled to Indonesia for the first Soviet visit since the abortive Communist coup in 1965. In all these trips, the Soviet political agenda has not been ignored. The Vladivostok speech referred to Moscow's role in Asia and repeated Brezhnev's proposal for the demilitarization of the Pacific and Indian oceans. With the end of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, all the aforementioned bilateral contacts were aimed at the cultivation of cordial state-to-state relations. Moreover, if Moscow could use the decline in oil prices and commercial disputes between these nations and the United States to its advantage, so much the better. For their part, many ASEAN nations are indeed hoping to open the Soviet market.²³

Gorbachev's *novoe myshlenie* seems to represent new approaches to international relations and to the third world. Indeed, it implies a thorough reexamination of the underlying premises of Moscow's policy. Gorbachev has argued that the Soviet Union needs an international environment conducive to economic reform and political restructuring. This means an amelioration of the superpower relationship, including arms control, verification procedures, increasing economic and political exchanges and trade. Furthermore, Gorbachev's attention to the superpower relationship appears to necessitate concession on regional conflicts as well. Although the "rules of the game" dictate that third world opportunities are to be seized only if a superpower confrontation could be avoided, it is clear

that Mikhail Gorbachev and his supporters recognize that Moscow's engagement in parts of the developing world has been costly to the superpower relationship. The Kremlin's willingness to consider withdrawal from Afghanistan (its own reasons notwithstanding), to support both the Central American peace initiative and the United States-brokered Angolan accords, and to pressure the PLO to recognize Israel makes it clear that the Soviet Union is trying to present a less threatening image.

Yet Gorbachev's third world policy also contains elements of what we might call "old thinking"; witness the Soviet Union's unwillingness to abandon old friends. Despite pressure on Kabul and despite the professions of freedom of choice for the Afghan people, Moscow continues the massive military airlift, estimated at \$100 million per month, and thus far it persists in seeking a negotiated settlement.²⁴ Elsewhere, if the Soviet Union is to retain its global status, the search for presence and influence cannot be abandoned.

To that end, military transfers as an instrument of policy have not been abandoned. Arms continue to flow to Cuba, Syria and Libya, to name a few. The one exception seems to be Nicaragua, where Gorbachev has promised to end arms assistance. Seeking diplomatic relations with Israel is a way of remaining involved in the Middle East. Additionally, the changes in Soviet Asian policy are designed to legitimize the long-standing Soviet claims that the Soviet Union is an Asian power.

Another example of older thinking that deserves mention is Soviet policy toward Iran. Moscow apparently began to favor ties with Iran in the fall of 1987. The pro-Teheran tilt continued throughout 1988 and perhaps reached its height in the first half of 1989. In January, the Ayatollah Javad Amoli met with Gorbachev to give him a message from Khomeini. Although the by-now famous letter was anti-Communist, it offered the prospect of better relations between the two neighbors. According to Teheran television, the letter stated:

It is clear to all that henceforth communism must be sought in the museums of world political history and that it is not possible for materialism to save humanity from the crisis of lack of spiritual conviction.

Yet it praised Gorbachev.

Since assuming his position, Mr. Gorbachev has been engaged in a new round of revision, development and facing up to world realities. Therefore, his holiness the imam regards Gorbachev's courage, boldness and bravery as praiseworthy.²⁵

The marked warming in Soviet-Iranian relations was at first coupled with an apparent moderation in Teheran's policy that included reestablishing diplo-

²²See Mikhail S. Gorbachev, *Perestroika* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), p. 185.

²³Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and the New Soviet Agenda in the Third World," RAND/R-3634-A, June, 1989.

²⁴*The New York Times*, June 18, 1989.

²⁵Teheran TV, January 4, 1989, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Near East and South Asia Daily Report*, 89-003, January 5, 1989, p. 40.

matic relations with West Europe. The Soviet Union welcomed these changes, but when the Rushdie affair broke, Moscow jumped at the chance to enhance ties with Teheran at the West's expense. Soviet statements were initially critical of the publicity given to the affair and leary of the impact on the course of Iranian politics. Yet, while condemning the death threats against Rushdie, the Soviet press also urged the West to be sensitive to Muslim sensibilities. Kremlin spokesman Gennady Gerasimov stated that Moscow was concerned over the unpredictability of the scandal (i.e., the re-radicalization of Iranian politics) and, therefore, it was natural that Shevardnadze should raise the issue on his trip.²⁶ In sum, it would seem that the Kremlin could not let the opportunity to ameliorate ties with the strategic prize of the region slip away.

Ironically, the ambiguity present in current Soviet policy toward the third world has created problems for Soviet relations with several radical less developed countries (LDC's). As noted above, Castro vociferously reminded Gorbachev of the latter's third world commitments. Moreover, one can find evidence of a defensiveness on the part of the Soviet Union. One analyst writing in *International Affairs* commented that Moscow had "no intention of leaving [its] friends in limbo . . ." and Georgi Mirski wrote in *Pravda* that the Soviet Union faced "absurd accusations that we have given up our socialist stance and abandoned class approaches and the interests of the national liberation movement."²⁷

Current Soviet diplomacy displays a pragmatism not previously apparent in foreign policy. The patterns of Soviet behavior in the third world under Gorbachev are a blend of the old and the new—all carried out with increasing flexibility, dexterity and diplomatic skill. The dour Andrei Gromyko was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze; Gorbachev, himself, cuts a far different Soviet figure from that of his predecessors. Other Soviet spokesmen travel widely and are more available to the press than they were under past regimes.

And, in an interesting twist, Gorbachev's Soviet Union has indicated its interest in using the United Nations as a forum for solving international problems. Interest in the United Nations became apparent when *Pravda* and *Izvestia* ran an article by Gorbachev entitled "The Realities and Guarantees of a Secure World."²⁸ In it, Gorbachev suggested enhancing the United Nations and strengthening the role of the secretary general. In addition, Moscow

paid its debt to the organization. This about-face in the Kremlin's attitudes toward the United Nations may be explained by the fact that the United Nations helped Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan and is helping to end the long Cuban involvement in Angola. Yet, it may well be that the changed attitude toward the United Nations is part of the well-orchestrated drive to enhance the Soviet Union's peaceable image. In either case, Moscow currently sees it to the Kremlin's advantage to support United Nations initiatives.

Finally, everything that Gorbachev has said indicates that the new policy is "the Soviet Union first." Thus, the new Soviet image, as informed by the alterations in policy, will facilitate Moscow's search for trading partners. Improved ties to Japan may ease the latter's investment in Siberian development projects, and the cultivation of Brazil, Argentina and the ASEAN states is designed to facilitate increased trade. One might also speculate that the overtures to Israel may have a trade-based motivation.

Perestroika at home requires better relations with the West, and the far-flung countries of the third world seem a likely place to signal Soviet intentions. None of this means, however, that Moscow is withdrawing from the third world. Gorbachev's policy blends some old and some new thinking. In the future, we are likely to see a Soviet Union that will consider its political and economic liabilities in making decisions about third world involvement. Moscow will probably continue to seize opportunities as they appear in the third world, but its policy will be less confrontational and certainly less ideological. ■

UNITED STATES—SOVIET DETENTE

(Continued from page 324)

alytical lens through which the Bush administration understands superpower relations has resulted in a certain myopia in United States policy, two outcomes are possible, neither of these outcomes particularly attractive from the perspective of the United States.

The first and more benign outcome is that Soviet leaders, their patience exhausted, call a halt to the cascade of concessions that has underwritten the improvement in superpower relations. At that point, United States decision-makers must decide either to pocket the modest rewards that have accrued thus far, while permitting the new détente to lapse, or to undertake a mid-course policy correction.

Should they choose the latter course, they will be compelled to make a number of difficult decisions. What concessions should the United States be prepared to offer—in arms control policy, for ex-

²⁶Tass, March 1, 1989, in FBIS, 89-040, March 2, 1989, pp. 27-28.

²⁷Igor Malashenko, "Nonmilitary Aspects of Security," *International Affairs*, no. 1 (1989), p. 50, and *Pravda*, January 25, 1989, p. 4, in FBIS, 89-016, January 26, 1989, p. 19.

²⁸*Pravda*, September 17, 1987, p. 2.

ample—in order to keep détente alive? In what areas can Washington accommodate Moscow without endangering other foreign policy goals? To date, the administration has been able to defer such decisions, for the most part, while the Soviet Union engages in what one United States analyst has termed a policy of preemptive surrender. This phase in relations may be nearing an end. And while American officials are unlikely to welcome the task of recasting their Soviet policy, they may choose to do so in order to keep the new détente from being stillborn.

From a United States perspective, the second outcome is even less attractive. Without abandoning the quest for improved superpower relations, Moscow could place greater emphasis on the cultivation of closer ties with the major countries of West Europe and with China, consistent with its view that the pursuit of a less threatening international environment can and must proceed simultaneously along several fronts. If Soviet policy begins to bear fruit—if, in other words, Soviet-West European and Soviet-Chinese relations improve, even as superpower relations stagnate—the United States could find itself both outmaneuvered and increasingly isolated diplomatically.

The impact on relations between the United States and its West European allies could be especially alarming from Washington's vantage point. The ability of the United States to influence both the character and the pace of East-West relations depends on a shared strategic vision among the larger NATO countries. To the extent that Soviet diplomacy succeeds in exacerbating intra-alliance tensions by offering rewards to individual Western countries that require the recipients to distance themselves from the positions of their allies, Western unity declines and United States goals become more difficult to attain. The recent imbroglio between Washington and Bonn over how and when to negotiate a reduction in NATO and Warsaw Pact short-range nuclear weapons—which Moscow did its best to exploit—should serve as an object lesson to United States decision-makers.¹⁴

This could prove to be an extremely difficult problem for the Bush administration, because it requires not only an awareness that the basic architecture of United States policy is flawed but also a willingness to undertake large-scale, rather than modest, corrective action. Policymakers do not lightly dispense with the familiar cognitive schemata by

reference to which they make sense of the world around them, so there is always the risk that their response to a challenge of this kind will prove inadequate and untimely.

THE OUTLOOK FOR RELATIONS

The burst of activism that has characterized the Bush administration's East-West diplomacy since mid-May strongly suggests that United States officials are beginning to revise key aspects of their Soviet policy. They appear to recognize that their initial conception of contemporary superpower relations failed to include important elements of the current situation. The change in posture is most noticeable in three areas central to, although notionally distinct from, United States-Soviet relations: the administration's policy toward the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, its reaction to recent events in China and its response to the dizzying developments in East Europe.

On May 29, 1989, in Brussels, the President previewed the new United States proposal on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in an effort to steal the limelight from Soviet officials who, a week earlier in Vienna, had outlined a far-reaching plan for reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. The Bush initiative, which caught many observers by surprise, would advance the timetable for initial agreement in the negotiations from two years (as proposed by Soviet leaders) to 6 to 12 months; would begin actual reductions in 1992–1993 rather than in 1997, as envisaged in Moscow's plan; would cut the number of American and Soviet troops stationed in Europe to 275,000 on each side; and would reduce the number of combat aircraft and helicopters on both sides to 15 percent below current NATO levels.¹⁵

The proposal to trim the number of United States and Soviet forces (which would require the withdrawal of some 30,000 American and 325,000 Soviet troops) and to reduce tactical aircraft was seen as especially significant in light of the steadfast American refusal to sanction such steps before the President's speech.¹⁶ The Bush administration was driven to revise its original CFE proposals, offered only 10 weeks earlier, because it needed to contain the effects in West Europe of Gorbachev's continuing "peace offensive" and to reassert its position of leadership within the Atlantic alliance. Whether the May initiative will succeed in restoring a sense of unity and common purpose among the Western allies once the cheering stops and the negotiations resume in the fall remains to be seen.

The Bush administration's extremely restrained response to the Chinese government's violent crackdown on dissent during the first week of June, 1989, also reveals sensitivity on Washington's part to the

¹⁴See, in particular, R. Jeffrey Smith, "Alliance Caught in Superpower Squeeze," *The Washington Post*, May 14, 1989, p. 1.

¹⁵See Don Oberdorfer, "Bush Proposes Cutback in U.S. Troops in Europe," *The Washington Post*, May 30, 1989, p. 1.

¹⁶*Ibid.*; see also Thomas L. Friedman, "Last-Minute Arms Policy Worries Bush's Critics," *The New York Times*, June 2, 1989.

possible negative implications for United States policy of any further deterioration in Sino-American relations.¹⁷ For Washington, things could go from bad to worse, of course, if Beijing seeks to compensate for whatever downturn eventually materializes in Sino-American ties by drawing closer to Moscow and if Soviet leaders respond favorably to Beijing. To the degree that the Chinese develop a strong and independent stake in a bilateral détente with Moscow, United States leverage with Beijing is diminished. A similar dilemma confronts American authorities as they scramble to meet the Soviet challenge in West Europe.

There is, finally, the evolution of United States policy toward East Europe, in particular Washington's response to the political dramas now being played out in Poland and Hungary. With the conclusion of the so-called "roundtable accords" in Warsaw on April 6, 1989, inviting the participation of a legalized Solidarity in the first contested parliamentary elections in Poland in 40 years, the Bush administration moved quickly to lend its support to the cause of democratization in that embattled country. It also offered encouragement to Hungarian leaders as they struggled uneasily with their own process of political reform, including the painful and sensitive task of reassessing the legacy of the 1956 revolution. President Bush's July, 1989, visits to Poland and Hungary mixed symbols and substance, with the American President assuring each country of the administration's strong political support, to be bolstered by the provision of modest financial assistance.¹⁸

Beyond the commitment of the administration to greater democracy and self-determination for East Europe, United States policy toward the region has a second, less altruistic dimension, to help realize more immediate American objectives. United States interest in and support for the reforms in Poland and Hungary constitute a subtle brake on Soviet diplomacy in West Europe, reminding Soviet leaders that improvements in relations between one superpower and the allies of the other can operate in both directions. It underscores the fact

that while each superpower has something to gain in Europe through a reduction in regional tensions, each also has something to lose.

The Soviet leadership understands only too well the need for an adroit and carefully crafted response to United States initiatives in arms control and East-West relations in Europe. Given its preoccupation with domestic issues—from the ongoing economic crisis to the violent expressions of resurgent nationalism in at least 7 of the Soviet Union's 15 republics¹⁹—the Soviet government must choose its battles carefully.

The Bush administration is pursuing a more active East-West policy in order to maintain the initiative and to offset possible Soviet gains. For this reason, Europe will be the scene of intense diplomatic activity over the next 6 to 12 months. Both superpowers are heavily committed, for example, to the success of the CFE negotiations. In this area, each superpower has declared that early and substantial progress is possible and desirable.

Other issues on the United States-Soviet agenda look less promising, at least in the short run. The START talks, which resumed in June, 1989, are a long way from completion; Washington is apparently in no special hurry to speed up the pace of the negotiations. While much of the agreement has been drafted, a number of difficult questions have yet to be resolved, ranging from what do with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and sea-launched cruise missiles to how to develop reliable and mutually acceptable procedures to monitor compliance.²⁰ The discussions on regional trouble spots, to which the administration attaches considerable importance, have generated only lukewarm enthusiasm in Moscow; the Soviet leadership prefers to build its own bridges to key regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America.²¹

Thus it seems reasonable to anticipate a year of considerable drama but modest achievement in superpower relations. Each government will aim at the political high ground. The real difficulty in United States-Soviet relations is not talk but action. It is a lesson, one might think, that leaders in Washington and Moscow should have learned long since.

¹⁷See the account of the President's news conference concerning developments in China, as reported in David Hoffman and Helen Dewar, "Bush Suspends Military Sales to China," *The Washington Post*, June 6, 1989, p. 1.

¹⁸*The New York Times*, July 11, 1989, and July 13, 1989.

¹⁹The seven Soviet republics in which violent expressions of nationalist sentiment have been reported are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Uzbekistan and Moldavia. Ostensibly peaceful protests have occurred in the three Baltic republics and the Ukraine.

²⁰See *The New York Times*, June 2, 1989, and June 13, 1989.

²¹Moscow's recent decision to provide military assistance to Iran is perhaps the best demonstration of the Soviet Union's strong interest in cultivating better bilateral ties with countries identified by Washington as important regional troublemakers.

SOVIET NATIONALITIES

(Continued from page 344)

uled for fall, 1989, until spring, 1990.* Given the results of the March elections, the evidence of expanding organizing activity among the nationalities, the continuing economic hardships confront-

*Ed. note: On July 24, Gorbachev announced that local and republic governments could decide for themselves when they wished to hold elections.

ing the population and the growing level of ethnic tensions, the prospect of local elections in 1990 threatens the party's control over representative institutions and, possibly, augurs the emergence of nationalist local governments throughout the non-Russian territories. But one year of "breathing room" will not reduce the challenge confronting Moscow. The politicization of ethnic identity in the Soviet Union is the product of broad social processes, not temporal events.

MODERNIZATION AND NATIONALISM

Since World War II, the Soviet population has been undergoing a process of rapid social modernization. By the 1980's, the population had become more urbanized and better educated, and a larger proportion of the workforce was employed in white-collar professional positions and as skilled labor. In short, an urban middle class had emerged. This process was most advanced in the more highly developed Baltic republics, but it proceeded most rapidly in the formerly underdeveloped republics of Central Asia. Social modernization had important consequences for interethnic relations.

Soviet researchers have reported a positive association between socioeconomic status and favorable attitudes toward internationality relations; that is, the higher an individual's educational level and the higher the professional level of his employment, the more likely he is to report favorable attitudes toward interactions with other nationalities. Thus, social modernization, which improves both the educational level and the socioeconomic status of large numbers of people, can have a strong positive effect on interethnic relations.¹¹

These Soviet researchers point out, however, that their findings were obtained at a time of substantial upward social mobility, which "could not but prompt in people a sense of satisfaction of national interests [and] facilitated the formation of friendly interethnic orientations." Among those "overeducated" for their current employment status, and those not satisfied with either opportunities for expressing initiative on the job or the job itself, attitudes toward internationality relations were not so positive. And, when the demand for employment exceeded the supply of positions, "this situation created in people a sense of a certain competition in the labor sphere, which in a multinational context was to a certain degree projected onto national relations." In short, it was the experience of upward

mobility rather than the social status of the respondents that was the source of favorable attitudes.

However, these researchers also found that the process of socioeconomic and cultural development that made accelerated rates of upward social mobility possible also "stimulated the development of national self-awareness." Moreover, they acknowledged, upward mobility "... is not always accompanied by adequate improvement in the internationality orientation of people, since it is accompanied by [increased] expectations." Indeed, they found that the achievement by nationality groups of "significant representation" in desirable positions "... created, on the one hand, a sense of satisfaction, but on the other—consistent with the law of rising expectations—it gave birth to really high demands, especially among the intelligentsia."

In another recent study, Soviet researchers reported that increased educational achievement and higher socioeconomic status were associated with an increased orientation toward "the development of democracy, economic initiative and the involvement of the masses in administration."¹² Their data suggests that in the non-Russian republics this orientation tends to be stronger among the indigenous nationalities than among Russians. Thus, paradoxically, the very success of Soviet developmental efforts has fueled the rise of national self-awareness among the peripheral nationalities, and the main beneficiaries of Soviet-sponsored social and economic development—the rising native elites—are likely to be experiencing the strongest increase in self-awareness.

Thus the politicization of ethnic identity in the Soviet Union is a process with three distinct sources. First, social modernization increases national consciousness, produces expectations of continuing improvements in material well-being and social status, and leads to aspirations for the expansion of personal freedom and the development of democracy. Second, the program of political reforms launched by Gorbachev has allowed popular political forces to organize and gain access to the policy process. Third, and most important, frustration of the expectations produced by social modernization has heightened the relevance of nationality, making it an effective basis for the mobilization of popular support by political activists and converting national consciousness into nationalism.

The frustration of expectations among the nationalities is likely to increase in the short term because Gorbachev's program of economic change has been accompanied by a slowdown in Soviet growth. This has not only worsened material conditions, but may reduce the regime's ability to continue to meet the demand for high-status jobs. The

¹¹Y.V. Arutiunian and Y.V. Bromlei, eds., *Sotsial, no-kulturnyi oblik Sovetskikh natsii* (The social and cultural face of the Soviet nation), (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), p. 380.

¹²Y.V. Arutiunian and L.M. Drobizheva, *Mnogoobrazie kulturnoi zhizni narodov S.S.S.R.* (The multivariied cultural lives of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.), (Moscow: Mysl, 1987).

latter situation is exacerbated still further by Gorbachev's apparent abandonment of President Leonid Brezhnev's policy of favoring indigenous personnel for appointment to elite positions, with the important exceptions of control over party personnel, the secret police (KGB) and the military, in the non-Russian republics.¹³

The inclusion of non-Russian republics in the Soviet Union thwarts their aspirations for personal freedom and democracy. As long as the Soviet system remains, at best, an authoritarian one-party regime, such aspirations cannot be fulfilled. But, for the Baltic nations, 20 percent of whose populations were 55 years old or older in 1987—that is, old enough to remember their existence as independent states before 1940, even the transition of the Soviet Union to democracy may not relieve the frustration of loss of independence.¹⁴ Managing the nationalities problem may require even more far-reaching political reforms than now seem likely.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The rise of nationalism has already had a significant impact on the Soviet political system. National elections and central representative institutions have become channels for popular political pressure on the leadership. And, when local elections for republic and local-level representative institutions are held in 1990, these are almost certain to become the focus of demands for expanded republic and local autonomy. The political appeal of nationalism has helped create forces that challenge the party's monopoly over the authoritative decision-making process in the Soviet Union.

In order to sustain the reform process, Gorbachev must devise formulas for accommodating these forces while preserving Communist rule. The search for such formulas has produced a wide-ranging debate, reflected in the pages of Soviet journals and newspapers.

Meetings of the leading Soviet researchers on nationality, for example, have included discussion of such issues as how to define "national interest," both in the sense of all-Soviet (countrywide) interest and in the sense of ethnic interest; the nature of economic relations between the republics, the scope of local

economic autonomy and the division of responsibility for funding sociocultural development; the distribution of political authority between the federal government and the governments of the constituent units, including discussion of decentralization of sufficient scope to change the nature of the political order from a federation to a confederation; the definition and role of regions in social, economic and political terms, including consideration of elevating the status of regions that do not now enjoy republic status or reducing the role of republics entirely; and decoupling cultural, linguistic and other "ethnic" rights from territorial status.¹⁵ This last issue has been tied to concern about inadequate protection of the rights of nationalities outside their home republics or regions—like Russians in the non-Russian republics—and nationalities who have no such unit of their own. And it has led naturally to assertions of the need to establish the full panoply of individual civil rights for all citizens, regardless of their ethnic status.

The juxtaposition of individual and communal rights is characteristic of what one participant described as "the wide polarization of views" now taking place among Soviet scholars who are attempting to come to grips with the policy implications of the nationality question. One of the most explosive divisions is between those who focus on the accommodation of demands from the non-Russians and those who seek to defend the role, status and privileges of the Russians. Just as activists in the non-Russian republics have called for the establishment of their native languages as their official state languages, some scholars have argued that Russian should be the official state language of the union as a whole. Similarly, scholars are raising important questions about the relative status of the Russian republic in any future arrangements.

The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) contains 52.4 percent of the Soviet population and an even larger proportion of the country's economy and resources.¹⁶ Any effort to redefine the status of a non-Russian republic therefore raises questions about the economic, administrative and ethnic regions of the RSFSR, many of which are at least as important to the union as many of the present republics.

Concern for the status of the Russian language and republic is accompanied by concern for the status of ethnic Russians, especially the 23.9 million resident in the non-Russian republics—many of them indigenous residents. This concern unfolds against a background of rising political activism among the Russian people, including growing nationalist sentiments. Russian nationalism not only imposes a constraint on efforts to accommodate the aspirations of the non-Russians, its predominantly

¹³Steven L. Burg, "Nationality Elites and Political Change" in Mark Beissinger and Lubomyr Hajda, eds., *Multinationality in Soviet Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, forthcoming).

¹⁴Goskomstate, *Naselenie S.S.S.R. 1987* (1987 U.S.S.R. Census), (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1988), pp. 72-73, 78-79, 92-93.

¹⁵"Navstrechu Plenumu TsK KPSS po sovershenstvovaniyu mezhnatsionalnykh otnoshenii v S.S.S.R." (Toward a CPSU Central Committee Plenum on improving relations between nationalities in the U.S.S.R.), *Sovetskaya Etnografiya* (Soviet Ethnography), no. 1 (1989), pp. 3-90.

¹⁶*Chislennost i sostav naseleniya S.S.S.R.*, p. 7.

conservative cast represents a powerful basis for the mobilization of opposition to concessions to the non-Russians and to the entire reform process. The failure of such an attempt in March, 1988, does not guarantee its failure under different circumstances in the future.

Close contact and cooperation among the popular political movements in the non-Russian republics will make it difficult for Gorbachev to pursue differentiated policies toward them. Any concession to one republic is likely to engender demands for the same from others. Indeed, the urgency of his remarks in July, 1989, indicates that Gorbachev can ill afford to make any further concessions. Nor can he turn to simple repression.† Repression would destroy both the limited freedoms of thought and action essential to the success of his program of economic reform and the base of popular support that has been so important in his struggle against more conservative forces in the Soviet leadership.

Thus activist nationalism has pushed Gorbachev onto a tightrope shared by all would-be reformers in authoritarian regimes. On the one hand, he must avoid going too far too fast, lest he prompt a reactionary intervention by still-powerful conservative forces fearing that events are out of control. On the other hand, he must move rapidly enough to satisfy those who seek change, to create new constituencies of supporters and to combine an alliance of sufficient strength to ensure his victory. ■

†As of this writing, it is not clear how far Gorbachev will allow the nationalists to go. In August, 1989, the Communist party Central Committee condemned the nationalist movements in the Baltic republics, saying that "things have gone [too] far."

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 346)

THE SUBTLEST BATTLE: ISLAM IN SOVIET TAJIKISTAN. By Muriel Atkin. (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1989. 66 pages, notes and map, \$8.00.)

This survey of Islam in the Soviet Union is the latest contribution to the *Philadelphia Papers* series. Muriel Atkin discusses the strength of Islamic values and ideology in Tajikistan, the central Soviet government's attitudes toward the Tajiks and the challenge Islam presents for Soviet domestic and foreign policy. R.S.B.

SOVIET SOCIETY TODAY. By Michael Rywkin. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989. 243 pages, chronology of events, map, suggested readings and index, \$35.00, cloth; \$12.50, paper.)

A well-written introduction to life in the Soviet

Union, *Soviet Society Today* discusses the "contradictions and enormous variations, and both positive and negative elements" in modern Soviet society. Rywkin details the complex roles of social classes and nationalities in Soviet life.

This study is effective because it concentrates on how Soviet society arrived at its present state. *Soviet Society Today* contains many brief analyses of the evolution in attitudes and norms in areas like health care, women's rights, the media, religion, dissent, emigration and fashion. R.S.B.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE STRATEGY OF NONALIGNMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD. By Roy Allison. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 298 pages, notes, select bibliography and index, \$39.50.)

The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Nonalignment in the Third World summarizes the Soviet courtship of neutral third world countries and the impact of "new thinking" on Soviet third world policy. The publishers claim that this is the first study of "the overall Soviet conception of nonalignment in the third world."

Allison details the successes and failures of several policy measures, including the pursuit of "neutralization" in regions like Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Nonalignment in the Third World* also provides a solid analysis of the primary goal of Soviet policy toward the nonaligned countries: the military denial of third world areas to the Western powers. R.S.B.

ALSO RECEIVED

A CHIP IN THE CURTAIN. By David A. Wellman. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989. 185 pages, illustrations, notes and index, \$4.75.)

U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION: A NEW FUTURE. Edited by Nish Jamgotch Jr. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989. 248 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$39.95.)

SOVIET NUCLEAR STRATEGY FROM STALIN TO GORBACHEV: A REVOLUTION IN SOVIET MILITARY AND POLITICAL THINKING. By Honoré M. Catudal. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989. 411 pages, appendixes, list of abbreviations, select bibliography and index, \$49.95, cloth; \$15.95, paper.)

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: VIEWS FROM THE REGION. Edited by Pushpa Thambipillai and Daniel C. Matuszewski. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989. 217 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$42.95.) ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of August, 1989, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arms Control

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Arab League

Aug. 1 — After 2 days of talks in Morocco, a mediation committee appointed by the Arab League to resolve the civil war in Lebanon suspends its efforts; the committee of the foreign ministers of Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Algeria says it is at a "dead end."

Cambodian Peace Conference

(See also *Cambodia*)

Aug. 1 — On the 3d day of the Paris conference, representatives agree to send a UN delegation to Cambodia to assess conditions for a cease-fire and for the eventual installation of a new government.

Aug. 10 — Prime Minister Hun Sen meets in Phnom Penh with the UN delegation and refuses to allow a UN role in resolving the conflict until the UN ends its support for a coalition government that includes the Khmer Rouge.

Aug. 25 — U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that the Paris peace talks on Cambodia are deadlocked; a "comprehensive settlement is not in sight."

Aug. 27 — Prince Norodom Sihanouk resigns as president of the National United Front, one of the political factions seeking to oust Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen's government. Sihanouk remains the leader of the non-Communist coalition.

Aug. 28 — In Paris, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas calls on the 19 nations represented at the meeting to make a final effort to agree on a peace plan before the conference ends on August 30.

Aug. 30 — The month-long peace talks in Paris end in failure, with the Cambodian participants blaming one another for the failure; delegates express hope that the conference will be reconvened within 6 months.

Central American Peace Plan

Aug. 5 — A meeting of the 5 Presidents of the countries involved in the Central American peace plan begins in Tela, Honduras.

Aug. 7 — The 5 Central American Presidents reach agreement asking Nicaraguan contra rebels to disband and to leave their camps in Honduras by December 8 under international supervision; if the rebels fail to leave, they will no longer receive U.S. funds and will be prevented from entering Nicaragua by a newly created international force at the Honduran border.

European Community (EC)

Aug. 1 — At a meeting of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) in Brussels, the EC and the U.S. tie emergency food relief to Poland to proposed free market reforms in the Polish economy.

International Court of Justice (World Court)

Aug. 6 — In Washington, D.C., U.S. and Soviet legal representatives reach an agreement stating that both countries will accept binding arbitration by the World Court in disputes over 7 treaties concerning terrorism and drug trafficking.

International Terrorism

(See also *Intl, International Court of Justice; Iran; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 1 — In Lebanon, the Revolutionary Justice Organization extends its deadline for killing American hostage Joseph Cicippio; the Shiite Muslim group said on July 31 that it would kill Cicippio if Israel does not release Sheik Abdul Karim Obeid, a senior leader of the pro-Iran Hezbollah faction in Lebanon who was kidnapped by Israel in July.

Israel says that it will release Sheik Obeid only if Lebanese factions exchange Western hostages and Israeli prisoners for all Shiite prisoners held by Israel.

Aug. 3 — Citing the intervention of "certain parties and countries," the Revolutionary Justice Organization says it is "freezing" its deadline for the execution of Joseph Cicippio.

Aug. 6 — The Revolutionary Justice Organization says it will consider exchanging Joseph Cicippio for Sheik Obeid and 450 Arab prisoners.

Aug. 11 — The Associated Press reports that Hezbollah's spiritual leader Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah has expressed interest in facilitating the release of hostages in Lebanon.

Aug. 20 — The Revolutionary Justice Organization threatens to harm American hostage Edward Tracy if the U.S. does not persuade France to recall its fleet; France has ordered several ships to Lebanon.

Aug. 21 — The French ambassador to Lebanon assures Muslim leaders that France does not intend to intervene in Lebanon.

Aug. 24 — Muslim forces shell the Christian-held port of Junieh as the French navy arrives off the Lebanese coast.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

(See *Intl, EC*)

Organization of American States (OAS)

(See *Intl, UN; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

(See also *Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 3 — In Tunis, PLO chairman Yasir Arafat tells 1,000 delegates at the Fatah congress that the uprisings in the Israeli-occupied lands "will not stop until the conclusion of a peace treaty" and until there is a Palestinian state "with Jerusalem as its capital."

Southwestern Africa Peace Plan

(See also *Intl, UN*)

Aug. 22 — The leaders of 8 African countries meet in Harare, Zimbabwe, to discuss alleged violations of the proposed cease-fire in Angola.

Aug. 23 — Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos blames the U.S. and South Africa for continuing Angola's civil war by supplying UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) guerrillas in Angola.

Aug. 24 — UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi declares that the truce in Angola has broken down and urges his followers to resume fighting.

United Nations (UN)

(See also *Intl, Cambodian Peace Conference; Cambodia; Lebanon*)

Aug. 7 — UN special envoy Under Secretary General Marrack

Goulding ends a 5-day visit to Lebanon and Syria to discuss the hostage crisis, with no apparent success.

Aug. 25—The UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) agree to form a joint commission to oversee the disarming and resettlement of Nicaraguan contras in Honduras, to start September 6.

Aug. 29—The Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution that calls for "complete compliance by all parties involved, particularly South Africa," with UN plans for Namibian independence.

AFGHANISTAN

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Aug. 28—Reuters reports that within the last 4 weeks, at least 300 people have been killed in northern Afghanistan in fighting between the Islamic party and the Islamic Society, 2 groups belonging to the 7-party rebel coalition.

ALGERIA

(See *Intl, Arab League*)

ANGOLA

(See *Intl, Southwestern Africa Peace Plan*)

ARGENTINA

(See *U.K., Great Britain*)

BOLIVIA

Aug. 2—In a congressional runoff election, Jaime Paz Zamora is chosen President, succeeding Victor Paz Estenssoro.

Aug. 6—In La Paz, Jaime Paz Zamora is inaugurated as President and vows to "fight against the threat of drug trafficking."

BULGARIA

(See *Turkey*)

CAMBODIA

(See also *Intl, Cambodian Peace Conference*)

Aug. 7—A delegation of UN fact finders sent by the international conference meeting in Paris arrives in Cambodia. The delegation will investigate the possibility of international monitoring of Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia.

Aug. 19—*The New York Times* reports that government and ruling party officials have drawn up plans for underground resistance in the event that the Khmer Rouge returns to power.

CHILE

Aug. 11—Center-right and right-wing political parties nominate former Finance Minister Hernán Büchi as their candidate in Chile's December, 1989, presidential election.

CHINA

(See also *Japan; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 2—The government announces that it will inspect individually owned businesses in an effort to end tax evasion.

Aug. 7—China announces that it has severed diplomatic relations with Grenada; in July, Grenada established official relations with Taiwan.

Aug. 11—In Beijing, a teacher who defaced the portrait of Chairman Mao Zedong above Tiananmen Gate on May 23 is given a life sentence.

Aug. 12—Citing a statement issued by the State Education Commission, *China Daily* reports that most college graduates will be required to work in villages or factories for 1 or 2 years after graduation.

Aug. 14—Officials announce that new students at Beijing University will be required to undergo military training before enrolling in classes.

Aug. 17—The Associated Press reports that Defense Minister Qin Jiwei and other high-ranking army officers have been detained by soldiers loyal to President Yang Shangkun in a dispute over the deputy chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the military post previously held by former General Secretary Zhao Ziyang.

Aug. 19—Reports of the arrest of Defense Minister Qin are called rumors by Chinese officials.

Aug. 28—The government announces that it will close down several privately owned companies, saying that there are too many.

Aug. 31—The government denies an August 30 Amnesty International report that Chinese authorities have executed many more prodemocracy demonstrators than the Chinese government announced and that security forces killed at least 1,000 civilians in the June crackdown.

COLOMBIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 18—A regional police commander is killed by the Medellín drug cartel; this is the 2d drug-related murder of a government official in 3 days.

Luis Carlos Galán, a leading presidential candidate in next year's election, is assassinated near Bogotá.

President Virgilio Barco Vargas proposes measures to combat the drug trade; the measures include seizing the assets of drug dealers, adopting new measures to protect judges and beginning the extradition of drug traffickers wanted abroad.

Aug. 20—Police officers and soldiers arrest about 10,000 people in a nationwide crackdown against drug trafficking.

Police officials reveal that a \$500,000 bounty was posted by drug dealers for anyone who would kill Galán.

Aug. 21—In Bogotá and Cali, officials seize 134 aircraft belonging to suspected drug traffickers. In Sucre, military officials arrest Eduardo Martínez Romero, a suspected leader in the Medellín drug cartel.

Aug. 22—Police arrest 5 suspects in the murder of Galán.

Authorities indicate that Martínez Romero may be extradited to the U.S.; the extradition treaty between the U.S. and Colombia was suspended in 1987.

Aug. 23—Drug traffickers blow up offices belonging to Colombia's 2 largest political parties and burn the houses of 2 politicians. In a communiqué issued in Medellín, they declare "total and absolute war" on the government.

In Medellín, 9 banks, including 7 banks owned by the government, are blown up.

Aug. 28—A group of Colombian government officials, including Justice Minister Monica de Greiff, meets with U.S. government representatives in Washington, D.C. The Colombian government denies an August 27 report that de Greiff has resigned because of death threats.

Aug. 29—In Medellín, 6 government-owned liquor stores are destroyed by bomb blasts.

Colombian television reports that Martínez Romero has been formally notified by Colombian officials of his extradition to the U.S.

CUBA

Aug. 5—Cuba's Communist party prohibits the circulation of 2 Soviet publications—*Moscow News* and *Sputnik*—because they "justify bourgeois democracy" and show a "fascination for the American way of life."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(See also *Germany, West*)

Aug. 22—During a demonstration marking the 21st anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, police arrest 370 protesters.

ETHIOPIA

(See also *U.S., Legislation*)

Aug. 3—The human rights group Amnesty International issues a report citing the Ethiopian government for "serious human rights abuses."

FRANCE

(See *Intl, Cambodian Peace Conference, International Terrorism*)

GERMANY, EAST

(See *Germany, West; Hungary*)

GERMANY, WEST

Aug. 8—West Germany closes its diplomatic mission in East Germany to the public; the mission has been besieged by East Germans seeking to emigrate.

Aug. 13—The West German embassy in Hungary is shut down after it is flooded with East Germans seeking to emigrate.

Aug. 21—Chancellor Helmut Kohl decides not to renominate Heiner Geissler as general secretary of the Christian Democratic Union. Geissler has been the 2d highest official in the party after Kohl.

Aug. 22—West Germany closes its embassy in Czechoslovakia because of the overflow of East Germans seeking to emigrate.

GRENADA

(See *China*)

HONDURAS

(See *Intl, Central American Peace Plan, UN*)

HUNGARY

(See also *Germany, West*)

Aug. 3—In a radio interview, an official from the Ministry of Internal Affairs says "it would not be impossible" for East Germans to receive political asylum in Hungary.

INDIA

(See also *Sri Lanka*)

Aug. 12—In Assam, fighting between Assamese and Bodo militants causes 90 deaths and leads more than 20,000 people to flee to refugee camps.

Aug. 27—*Press Trust of India* reports that suspected Sikh militants indiscriminately shot at a passenger train in Punjab state, using AK-47 automatic weapons. 20 people have been killed and 30 people have been wounded in the attack.

Aug. 29—A day after agreeing to a cease-fire, Bodo militants in Assam bomb a bus, killing 12 people.

Aug. 30—Political opponents of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stage a general strike and call on Gandhi to resign. Fighting between rival political groups has resulted in 11 deaths.

IRAN

(See also *Intl, International Terrorism*)

Aug. 3—Hashemi Ali Akbar Rafsanjani is inaugurated as Iran's President.

Aug. 4—In a sermon during which he denounces the U.S. and Israel, President Rafsanjani offers to help the U.S. solve the hostage crisis in Lebanon.

Aug. 8—Iran proposes to help the U.S. to obtain the release of hostages in Lebanon if the U.S. releases Iranian assets frozen since 1979.

Aug. 19—The official Iranian press agency reports that President Rafsanjani has not reappointed Interior Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashemi despite appeals from over half the members of Iran's Parliament.

Aug. 29—Parliament approves President Rafsanjani's entire slate of 22 candidates for the Cabinet.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, International Terrorism, PLO; Iran; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 11—Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin orders an extension from 6 months to 1 year of the period that Palestinians can be held without trial.

Aug. 27—Israeli air force planes bomb Hezbollah headquarters in southern Lebanon, killing 2 people.

Aug. 29—Ismail Ibrahim Abu Jayad, an alleged leader of the uprising in the Israeli-occupied territories, is killed during a skirmish with Israeli troops.

JAPAN

Aug. 9—Former Education Minister Toshiki Kaifu takes office as Prime Minister, succeeding Souseuke Uno, who resigned on July 24.

For the 1st time, 2 women are chosen as Cabinet ministers: Mayumi Moriyama is appointed director general of the Environmental Agency and Sumiko Takahara is named director general of the Economic Planning Agency.

Aug. 17—The government announces that it is ready to resume economic aid to China; it also lifts its recommendation to business executives against travel in China, with the exception of travel in Beijing, which remains under martial law.

Aug. 21—A leading Japanese newspaper reports that in 1987 Japan became the world's richest nation, surpassing the U.S. in national assets for the first time.

Aug. 25—After 1 month in office, Chief Cabinet Secretary Tokuo Yamashita resigns, admitting that he has had an extramarital affair. Mayumi Moriyama, named to succeed him, is the first woman ever named Cabinet Secretary.

Aug. 29—*The New York Times* reports that Mitsui Bank and Taiyo Kobe Bank are planning to merge. This merger, to take effect April 1, 1990, will create the second largest bank in the world, behind Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank.

KOREA, NORTH

(See *Korea, South*)

KOREA, SOUTH

Aug. 15—Im Su Kyong, a student who visited North Korea illegally to promote reunification, is arrested at the Panmunjom border.

Aug. 25—Kim Dae Jung, the head of the opposition Party for Peace and Democracy, is accused of failing to report a secret trip to North Korea made by Suh Kyung Won, a member of the National Assembly. According to national security laws, unauthorized travel to North Korea is forbidden. Kim says the charges against him have been fabricated in order to discredit his opposition party.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Arab League, International Terrorism, UN; Iran; Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 12—In the last 2 days of intense fighting between Christian and Muslim forces in Beirut and across the country, 47 people have died.

Aug. 16—Fighting continues as Muslim and Christian forces ignore a UN call for a cease-fire.

Aug. 29—A tanker headed for Junieh is hit during an artillery battle between Christian and Muslim gunners; 7 of the 11 crewmen on board are killed.

MEXICO

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

MOROCCO

(See *Intl, Arab League*)

MYANMAR (Burma)

Aug. 25—The American embassy in Yangon (Rangoon) says it has documentation of the routine and sometimes fatal mistreatment of political prisoners.

NAMIBIA

(See also *Intl, UN*)

Aug. 10—SWAPO (the South West Africa People's Organization) accuses South Africa of rigging Namibia's 1st free elections, scheduled for November, 1989.

NEW ZEALAND

Aug. 7—Prime Minister David Lange resigns, citing ill health.
Aug. 8—Former Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer is selected Prime Minister. He says that New Zealand will not change its policy banning from its waters foreign naval vessels that carry nuclear weapons.

NICARAGUA

(See also *Intl, Central American Peace Plan, UN*)

Aug. 3—Nicaragua suspends its military draft, effective September 1, 1989, until the conclusion of national elections scheduled for early 1990.

Aug. 4—Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Saavedra and internal opposition leaders sign an agreement asking the contra rebels to disband. The pact sets February 25, 1990, as the date for national elections.

PANAMA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

PHILIPPINES

(See also *Singapore*)

Aug. 1—President Corazon Aquino signs a law that could lead to limited autonomy for provinces where most Philippine Muslims live. The law provides for the election of a regional executive and a regional legislature in parts of Mindanao, Palawan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi islands.

Aug. 28—The military announces that it has arrested a Communist guerrilla who admitted participating in the April 21 assassination of U.S. Army Colonel James Rowe.

POLAND

(See also *Intl, EC*)

Aug. 1—A vote in Parliament to confirm Czeslaw Kiszczak as Prime Minister is delayed when the Peasant party refuses to approve Kiszczak's nomination. In a show of hands, 13 members of the Communist party oppose Kiszczak's nomination.

Aug. 2—Kiszczak is confirmed as Prime Minister by a vote of 237 to 173, with 10 abstentions; he needed 211 votes to win.

Aug. 7—Solidarity leader Lech Walesa says he is "categorically" opposed to the formation of a new government by Prime Minister Kiszczak; Walesa then calls for the formation of a Solidarity-led Cabinet supported by the Peasant party and the Democratic party, 2 traditional allies of the Communist party.

Aug. 11—Solidarity begins a series of work stoppages to protest the Communist party's unwillingness to enact political and economic changes in Poland.

Aug. 15—President Wojciech Jaruzelski asks for an emergency meeting of "the main political and social forces" in Poland to end the deadlock over a new government.

Aug. 16—A joint session of Solidarity, the Peasant party and the Democratic party proposes that Walesa form Poland's next government.

Walesa turns down the position of Prime Minister, but offers to help form a new Cabinet.

Aug. 17—Prime Minister Kiszczak resigns; President Jaruzelski says he will "urgently consider" a government led by Solidarity.

Aug. 19—President Jaruzelski officially nominates Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a high-level Solidarity leader, to succeed Kiszczak as Prime Minister.

Aug. 21—Walesa says the Communist party is using "threats and blackmail" to counter Solidarity's efforts.

Aug. 22—After receiving a phone call from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Communist party leaders drop their demands for greater representation in the government.

Aug. 24—Parliament confirms Mazowiecki as Prime Minister by a vote of 387 to 4, with 41 abstentions; Mazowiecki becomes the 1st non-Communist Prime Minister in Poland since World War II.

The Soviet Union congratulates Mazowiecki on his election.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See *Intl, Arab League*)

SINGAPORE

Aug. 4—The government offers to accommodate U.S. Navy and Air Force facilities currently in the Philippines.

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Intl, Southwestern Africa Peace Plan, UN; Namibia*)

Aug. 3—Five weeks of elections for white, mixed-race and Indian parliamentary houses begin.

Aug. 9—Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda announces that he will meet National party leader F.W. de Klerk in Zambia on August 28; President Kaunda has been a vocal opponent of apartheid.

Aug. 10—South African President P.W. Botha complains publicly that he was not consulted about de Klerk's trip to Zambia.

Aug. 14—Botha announces his resignation as President on national television; Botha says he is quitting because he has been ignored by his Cabinet.

Aug. 15—F.W. de Klerk becomes Acting President, replacing P.W. Botha; de Klerk is expected to become President if the National party wins parliamentary elections in September.

Aug. 25—In Zaire, F.W. de Klerk meets with Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko.

Aug. 28—In Zambia, F.W. de Klerk and Zambian President Kaunda talk for several hours; Kaunda is the leader of the group of front-line states opposed to South Africa's apartheid policy.

SRI LANKA

Aug. 4—Negotiations on the withdrawal of the remaining Indian troops from Sri Lanka end. India and Sri Lanka are deadlocked on the issues of timing and measures to protect the Tamil minority.

Aug. 14—*The New York Times* reports that 2 Sinhalese radicals assassinated a prominent state television broadcaster on August 13. The same day, 38 other people were killed in related violence across the country.

Aug. 17—24 Indian soldiers are killed by Tamil militants outside a hospital in northwestern Sri Lanka. The Tamils fired on the soldiers using machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and rocket launchers.

SYRIA

(See *Intl, UN*)

TAIWAN

(See *China*)

TURKEY

Aug. 21—Turkey closes its border with Bulgaria, because of the large number of ethnic Turks fleeing Bulgaria; over 300,000 Bulgarian Turks have emigrated since May, 1989.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, International Court of Justice; Cuba; Czechoslovakia; Poland; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 5—The 542-member Supreme Soviet adjourns until September 25.

Aug. 6—Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arrives in Kabul for 2 days of talks with Afghan President Najibullah.

Aug. 8—Estonia's Parliament approves a law endorsing stricter residency requirements for voters and candidates in elections.

Aug. 9—In Tallinn, Estonia's capital, 20,000 non-Estonian workers strike to protest legislation restricting their right to vote in Estonia.

Aug. 10—The Soviet news agency Tass reports that the government will start paying farmers in foreign currency in return for crops grown in excess of average production.

Estonian authorities ban further strikes by non-Estonian workers.

Aug. 11—A Justice Ministry official says that the residency legislation passed by the Estonian legislature is unconstitutional and should be considered "null and void."

Aug. 14—Estonian Communist party leader Vaino Valjas asks 20,000 non-Estonian workers to end their strike.

Aug. 16—The Supreme Soviet Presidium, which includes President Mikhail Gorbachev, denounces the Estonian residency law as a violation of "human rights."

Aug. 17—*Pravda* reports that the Communist party may revise the 1922 agreement that unified the 15 Soviet republics into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.).

Aug. 18—Politburo member Aleksandr N. Yakovlev says that "without a doubt" the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed a secret treaty in 1939 that ceded the Baltic states to the Soviet Union.

Aug. 22—A Lithuanian parliamentary commission challenges the validity of the Soviet Union's 1940 annexation of Lithuania.

Aug. 23—To commemorate the 50th anniversary of the 1939 Nazi German-Soviet Pact, over 1 million people in the Baltic states demand independence.

Aug. 26—The Communist party Central Committee issues a statement warning the Baltic republics that "things have gone [too] far" and that "the very viability of the Baltic nations could be called into question."

Aug. 27—Nationalist leaders in the Baltic states condemn the August 26 Central Committee statement.

In Moldavia, 300,000 protesters demand that Moldavian be made the official language of the republic.

Aug. 28—After emergency sessions of the Central Committees in the Baltic republics, the 3 republic party leaders—Algirdas Brazauskas (Lithuania), Vaino Valjas (Estonia) and Janis Vagras (Latvia)—issue statements addressing Moscow's concern about separatist extremism but criticizing its interference in local affairs.

Aug. 29—Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov confirms reports that President Mikhail Gorbachev helped write the Central Committee statement condemning Baltic nationalism.

Aug. 31—The leaders of the Latvian and Estonian Popular Fronts and a Lithuanian populist group meet in Riga, Latvia, and criticize the Central Committee statement on nationalism as "sinister and dangerous."

The Moldavian legislature completes legislation establishing Moldavian as the official language of the republic.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *U.S., Science and Space*)

Aug. 18—Great Britain and Argentina announce that in October they will begin talks to restore diplomatic relations.

Hong Kong

(See also *Vietnam*)

Aug. 5—The government appoints its first ethnic Chinese police commissioner.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Aug. 1—In a letter to the Senate Banking Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Jack Kemp announces a management overhaul of HUD called "FHA for the 1990's" to "firmly monitor and control lender activities."

Aug. 2—The director of U.S. drug control policy William Bennett asks President George Bush to double the amount of money appropriated for new prisons; he also asks for a 40 percent increase in funds for drug treatment programs in fiscal 1990. Bennett is asking for \$1 billion more than the \$5.96 billion already proposed by the President.

The Justice Department indicts 46 commodities brokers of the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange on a variety of charges, including skimming investors' profits and stealing as a usual practice.

Aug. 12—The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports an increase of 5.5 percent in violent crime in the nation in 1988; there were 1.56 million violent crimes and 12.36 million property crimes during that period.

Aug. 14—President Bush nominates Richard C. Breeden as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission; Breeden will succeed David Ruder, who announced his resignation in May.

Aug. 15—President Bush endorses Bennett's "balanced, decisive, effective and achievable" drug enforcement plan, saying "it will target all aspects of the problem" and that he will find ways to make the money available without raising taxes.

Aug. 16—The Federal Drug Administration (FDA) announces that it will test 30 more generic drug samples in its ongoing investigation of the generic drug industry; these 30 drugs account for 75 percent of the generic drugs on the market, with a market value of \$4.7 billion.

Aug. 18—Secretary of Health and Human Services Louis Sullivan announces a new plan of expanded inspection and supervision to "deal decisively with corrupt and fraudulent practices" in the generic drug industry.

Aug. 19—The Interior Department reports that the possible U.S. supply of crude oil assets from known oil fields amounts to some 49 billion barrels, a supply sufficient for 26 years; 8 years ago, the department estimated this reserve at 83 billion barrels.

Aug. 22—The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) files 13 suits against various building operators and institutions for violation of the Clean Air Act regulations regarding the removal of asbestos from buildings.

Aug. 23—The FDA announces plans to inspect 20 more generic drug manufacturers.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service says it will start to use a new type of card for permanent-resident aliens immediately to help control fraudulent use of the old card.

Aug. 30—The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules that U.S. airlines are required to install 150 new \$750,000-bomb-detectors by the end of 1991.

Economy

Aug. 3—The Commerce Department says that its index of leading economic indicators fell 0.1 percent in June.

Aug. 4—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate remained at 5.2 percent in July.

Aug. 11—The Labor Department announces that its producer price index fell 0.4 percent in July.

Aug. 18—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.2 percent in July.

The Commerce Department says that the U.S. trade deficit for June declined to \$8.2 billion, the lowest figure in 4.5 years.

Aug. 22—The new office of Thrift Supervision, which succeeded the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, says that U.S. savings and loan institutions lost \$3.7 billion in the 2d quarter of 1989.

Aug. 24—The New York Stock Exchange's Dow Jones Industrial Average of 30 blue-chip stocks closes at a new record high of 2,734.64, surpassing the old record of 2,722.42 set 2 years ago.

Aug. 28—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit for the 2d quarter of 1989 dropped to \$27.7 billion, the best showing in over 4 years.

Aug. 29—The Commerce Department, revising its July estimate of the annual rate of increase of the nation's gross national product (GNP), reports that GNP grew at an annual rate of 2.7 percent in the 2d quarter of 1989.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Cambodian Peace Conference, Central American Peace Plan, EC, International Court of Justice, International Terrorism, PLO, Southwestern Africa Peace Plan; Colombia; Iran; Japan; Myanmar; Philippines; Singapore*)

Aug. 2—According to White House officials, in a letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Secretary of State James Baker 3d proposed early inspection of chemical arms before a treaty banning chemical weapons is concluded; it is reported that the Soviet Union has accepted the U.S. proposal.

Aug. 7—Secretary of State Baker meets in Mexico City with Mexico's Foreign Minister Fernando Solarea to sign minor agreements and discuss future relations.

Aug. 9—The State Department authorizes the return to China of 260 dependents of U.S. embassy personnel; they were evacuated 2 months ago.

Aug. 10—The State Department criticizes Fatah's August 8 "political program," which, in part, called for escalation of "armed action" against Israel; a spokesman says this is a step that undermines the hope of a negotiated Middle East settlement.

Aug. 25—President Bush says he will provide a \$65-million emergency aid package to Colombia to fight drug traffickers; the package will include equipment for Colombian police and military.

Aug. 30—The U.S. embassy in Bogotá, Colombia, orders the evacuation of all embassy dependents from Colombia because of the danger from drug traffickers.

Aug. 31—Addressing a special session of the OAS called at the request of the U.S., Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger offers a list of U.S.-compiled evidence that Panama's de facto leader General Manuel Noriega has made Panama "a haven for drug traffickers and has amassed a \$200-million to \$300-million personal fortune from criminal activities."

Labor and Industry

Aug. 6—About 160,000 telephone operators, installers and other workers strike against 3 of the country's 7 regional phone companies, serving some 32 million customers.

Aug. 13—Another 39,500 telephone workers in the Midwest go on strike; the nationwide total of striking workers has reached almost 200,000.

Legislation

Aug. 1—The Senate Judiciary Committee votes 7 to 7, rejecting the nomination of William Lucas as assistant attorney general for civil rights; a majority vote is needed to send the nomination to the full Senate.

Aug. 5—Legislation approving a \$166-billion rescue bailout of the savings and loan industry, which passed in the Senate without a recorded vote late on August 3, is passed by the House, 201 to 175, at 33 minutes after midnight.

The 101st Congress adjourns until September.

Aug. 9—At a news conference, President Bush signs the legislation for the \$166-billion bailout of the savings and loan industry.

Aug. 13—The wrecked aircraft that was carrying Representative Mickey Leland (D., Tex.) is found in western Ethiopia; Leland and all others aboard, including 8 from the U.S., have been found dead; Leland, chairman of the House Select Committee on Hunger, was making one of his many trips to inspect refugee camp conditions.

Aug. 14—President Bush signs the \$97-million Disaster Assistance Act of 1989 to bring "important relief to farm families hit by the extreme weather."

Military

Aug. 11—President Bush names former national security adviser General Colin L. Powell to be chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, succeeding the resigning Admiral William Crowe Jr.

Political Scandal

Aug. 20—Attorney General Richard Thornburgh says that the Justice Department is investigating a total of some 1,000 cases of possible wrongdoing in HUD.

Science and Space

Aug. 8—The space shuttle *Columbia* is launched into space to carry out a Defense Department mission with a classified payload.

Aug. 12—The *Columbia* lands safely at Edwards Air Force Base after the successful deployment of a spy satellite.

Aug. 21—The unmanned spacecraft *Voyager 2*, after traveling in space for some 12 years, sends back spectacular views of the planet Neptune and its largest moon, Triton.

Aug. 27—As it leaves the solar system, *Voyager 2* sends photos showing signs of volcanos on Triton possibly caused by liquid nitrogen or methane eruptions.

A Delta rocket is launched from Cape Canaveral carrying a television broadcasting satellite for British Satellite Broadcasting Company; this is the first privately owned satellite to be launched.

VIETNAM

(See also *Cambodia*)

Aug. 18—121 Vietnamese return to Vietnam in the largest recorded voluntary repatriation of refugees from Hong Kong.

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
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